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WHEN IS A USE IN COMMERCE A 
NONCOMMERCIAL USE? 
LEE ANN W. LOCKRIDGE*
ABSTRACT
 When is a use in commerce a noncommercial use? This question 
may sound like the opening for a ridiculous legal riddle, but it is a 
real conundrum in trademark dilution law. The current federal dilu-
tion statute, section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, creates liability based on 
the “use of a mark or trade name in commerce,” when that use is likely 
to blur or tarnish a famous mark. At the same time, the statute cha-
racterizes certain activities as nonactionable “exclusions,” including 
“any noncommercial use of a mark.” So the use of a mark in commerce 
can be a noncommercial use—but how—and why? This Article com-
prehensively examines the statutory exclusion for “noncommercial use 
of a mark” within the federal dilution statute. This includes the legis-
lative history of the federal dilution statute, trademark and First 
Amendment jurisprudence, and court decisions to date interpreting 
the statute. Based on this research, the Article explains how courts 
and potential litigants should interpret the exclusion to achieve its 
purpose as a predictable, efficient defense that excuses a broad range 
of expressive uses. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 The current federal dilution cause of action, enacted in 2006 to re-
place the 1995 statute, provides as follows: 
                                                                                                                    
 * Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. I thank 
Professors Mark Janis and Lisa Ramsey for their valuable comments on this Article. 
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Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous 
mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired dis-
tinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against 
another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has 
become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in 
commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilu-
tion by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the 
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competi-
tion, or of actual economic injury.1
 As set forth in Parts II.B.-D. of this Article, Congress recognized 
the possibility of a serious First Amendment problem with the expan-
sive scope of dilution liability. Congress addressed this concern by ex-
empting certain uses through statutory exclusions. This Article deals 
with one of those exclusions: “[a]ny noncommercial use of a mark.”2
 The appropriate interpretation of “noncommercial use of a mark” 
does not immediately leap from the statutory text or even the broad-
er context of trademark dilution. Depending on whether the meaning 
of “use in commerce” is more than merely jurisdictional, the confu-
sion might even rise to the level of a textual conflict. As a result, gen-
eral principles of interpretation point to the legislative history of the 
exclusion.3 That history indicates that the correct interpretation  
of “noncommercial use of a mark” is use of a mark in speech that is 
not pure “commercial speech” as understood in First Amendment ju-
risprudence.4 The exclusion, then, restricts actionable dilution to 
commercial speech.  
 Unfortunately, numerous court decisions have failed to fully ap-
preciate the role of the exclusion. Many, if not most, courts exploring 
the issue of commercial versus noncommercial use before 2006 fo-
cused on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act’s (FTDA’s) “commercial 
use in commerce” language in the primary liability provision rather 
than the “noncommercial use” language in the exclusion.5 And al-
                                                                                                                    
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). Dilution by blurring is defined as “association 
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs 
the distinctiveness of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). Dilution by tarnishment 
is defined as “association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a 
famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
When the user of the diluting mark “willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the 
famous mark” or “willfully intended to harm the reputation of the famous mark,” monetary 
remedies are also available. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C). 
 3. Even Justice Scalia, who regularly expresses disdain for the use of legislative 
history, has accepted reference to legislative history in order to obtain the meaning of an 
otherwise conflicting or nonsensical statute. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 
U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 22-23, 31 (1997). 
 4. See infra Parts II.C.-D. 
 5. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)). For example, in Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. 
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though the Trademark Dilution Reform Act (TDRA) of 2006 elimi-
nated the “commercial use” language, courts may continue to focus on 
the “use . . . in commerce” language,6 extending the trend of disre-
garding the noncommercial use exclusion. In some instances this is 
appropriate, but in others it unnecessarily complicates resolution of 
the case, which might easily be reached under the noncommercial use 
exclusion. Other courts applying the FTDA and TDRA have reached 
the exclusion but have applied it incorrectly by failing to utilize First 
Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence when applying the ex-
clusion.7 And other courts, even those purporting to apply the statu-
                                                                                                                    
Kremer, Kremer was displeased with hair-restoration services received from Bosley 
Medical Institute and started a website at www.bosleymedical.com in which he strongly 
criticized the company. 403 F.3d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2005). Bosley Medical sued Kremer 
for trademark infringement, dilution, and cybersquatting under the Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), among other claims. Id. at 675, 680. 
Although the Ninth Circuit determined that the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Kremer on the ACPA claim was improper, it affirmed summary judgment for 
Kremer on the infringement and dilution claims by finding that Kremer’s site was 
noncommercial. Id. at 676-80. The court did not base its ruling specifically on the 
noncommercial use exclusion; instead, it based the ruling on a construction of both 
infringement and dilution under the Lanham Act that required “commercial use.” Id. at 
676-77. The court found that only a use “in connection with a sale of goods or services” 
would constitute commercial use. Id. at 677. Although the Ninth Circuit panel in Kremer
referenced the First Amendment and the court’s own decision in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA 
Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), in explaining why a distinction could be drawn 
between commercial and noncommercial uses, the court did not use First Amendment 
commercial speech doctrine to explain its requirement of a “commercial use.” Kremer, 403 
F.3d at 677. Instead, it used the language of sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id.
As a result, the court applied its interpretation of the standard for a prima facie case, 
rather than the standard for proving the noncommercial use exclusion. See also TMI, Inc. 
v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2004) (briefly examining the “commercial use in 
commerce” language and noting that the noncommercial use exclusion “further indicates 
that the provision only applies to commercial use,” but not appearing to acknowledge the 
speech-protective implications of the exclusion).    
 6. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 
(2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)). 
 7. For example, in a series of domain-name related cases, courts created a 
“commercial effects” rationale that was applied to both “commercial use in commerce” and 
“noncommercial use.” In Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, one of the later domain name cases 
following the “commercial effects” rationale, the noncommercial use exclusion was directly 
addressed by the court. 993 F. Supp. 282, 307 (D.N.J. 1998). The court acknowledged that 
the exclusion was intended to exclude protected speech from the reach of dilution liability. 
Id. Interestingly, although the court addressed the issue under the heading “The Use by 
Defendant of the Mark and the Name of the Plaintiff Organization Constitutes Commercial 
Speech,” it did not refer to any First Amendment commercial speech cases when making its 
determination. Id. The court concluded that the site’s use was commercial because (1) it 
was a “bogus” site intended to intercept persons interested in the Jews for Jesus 
organization; (2) it linked to the Outreach Judaism Organization website, which raised 
money through sales of merchandise; and (3) the use was “designed to harm the Plaintiff 
Organization commercially by disparaging it and preventing the Plaintiff Organization 
from exploiting the Mark . . . . In addition, [it would] continue to inhibit the efforts of 
Internet users to locate the Plaintiff Organization Internet site.” Id. at 308. For this 
“effects” analysis of noncommercial use, the court referred to Panavision Int’l, L.P., v. 
Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996), and Planned Parenthood Fed’n of America 
Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), two earlier domain name dilution 
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tory exclusion, have raced past the exclusion to create a ruling direct-
ly based on the First Amendment.8 Fortunately, a few courts have 
applied the First Amendment “definition” of commercial speech to in-
terpret and apply the noncommercial use exclusion, as the legislative 
history indicates they should.9 In so doing, these courts ensured that 
dilution liability reaches only purely commercial speech, as Congress 
apparently intended. 
 This Article comprehensively analyzes the noncommercial use ex-
clusion, including its legislative and jurisprudential history. Applying 
a nuanced reading of First Amendment cases to the meaning of the 
noncommercial use exclusion means that uses blending commercial 
and noncommercial speech elements fall within the exclusion, not 
within the scope of dilution liability. A bare reading of the statute, 
even if combined with a nominal First Amendment analysis, could 
leave mixed speech in an indeterminate status within dilution. Inde-
terminacy can chill expressive uses. This Article recommends inter-
preting the noncommercial use exclusion as a broad affirmative de-
fense that predictably and efficiently narrows the reach of federal di-
lution liability to purely commercial speech.  
II.   HISTORY OF THE NONCOMMERCIAL USE EXCLUSION
A.   Dilution Before 1988 
 Significant experience with trademark dilution laws in the United 
States is relatively short, despite the fact that the first extended ar-
gument in favor of the cause of action was made over eighty years 
ago in an American law review article by Frank Schechter.10 He ar-
                                                                                                                    
cases. It referred to these cases with respect to “noncommercial use” even though 
Panavision only superficially considered speech interests because the facts did not warrant 
additional inquiry, and Planned Parenthood addressed its “effects” analysis to the prima 
facie case, not to the exclusion. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. at 308; see Panavision, 945 F. Supp. 
at 1303; Planned Parenthood, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1437.  
 8. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (acknowledging the speech-protective function of the exclusion but concluding 
that the district court’s injunction under the FTDA violated the First Amendment, rather 
than basing its decision on the statutory exclusion).  
 9. See, e.g., Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905 (“[T]he legislative history of the FTDA suggests 
an interpretation of the ‘noncommercial use’ exemption that both solves our interpretive 
dilemma and diminishes some First Amendment concerns: ‘Noncommercial use’ refers to a 
use that consists entirely of noncommercial, or fully constitutionally protected, speech.”); 
American Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695-96 (N.D. Ohio 2002) 
(“[W]hen Congress passed the [FDTA], it used the phrase ‘noncommercial use’ as a 
somewhat inexact, short hand reference to ‘speech protected by the First Amendment.’ ”); 
Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1573-74 (S.D. Cal. 1996) 
(holding that the noncommercial use exclusion exempts from FTDA claims the expressive 
use of trademarks because such uses are protected by the First Amendment). 
 10. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813 (1927); see also DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-9 (2002). Even so, Schechter was not the first person to conclude 
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gued for a recalibration of the focus of trademark infringement law 
away from confusion, which begets the relative question of whether a 
second use of a mark is sufficiently competitive to create actionable 
confusion.11 He advocated the application of what he thought was the 
more realistic basis for existing decisions, namely the more absolute 
notion of a mark’s uniqueness, and thus its selling power.12 He based 
this argument both on his analysis of recent cases, in which courts 
had begun to provide protection to trademarks when related (and not 
just competitive) goods bore an infringing mark, and on his observa-
tion that “coined” marks (often referred to as fanciful marks in cur-
rent trademark parlance) received greater protection in infringement 
actions than “commonplace” ones.13 Where there is no uniqueness to 
preserve, Schechter’s argument does not support broad protection of 
a mark such that a mark owner could enjoin its use on noncompeti-
tive goods—even a “commercial use” or “trademark use” of the mark 
on those goods.14
 Two decades after Schechter wrote, state laws began to incorpo-
rate the dilution rationale. The cause of action defined by state legis-
latures, however, bore little relationship to Schechter’s analysis and 
prescription for protecting uniqueness. Schechter advocated broad 
protection of unique, inherently distinctive marks and narrow protec-
tion of noninherently distinctive marks because, he argued, actual 
uniqueness was the real power and value of a mark that needed 
strong legal protection. This reasoning, however, did not take hold in 
state law. State laws reflected only the concept of restricting uses of 
marks that made any senior mark less distinctive.15
 Massachusetts adopted the first dilution statute in 1947, with Il-
linois, New York, and Georgia following within the next decade.16
These early statutes provided for injunctive relief, even in the ab-
                                                                                                                    
that trademark rights should extend beyond truly confusing uses. Welkowitz’s treatise 
presents two cases that Welkowitz argues use dilution-like rationales under the guise  
of confusion-based decisions. Id. n.15 (citing Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. John 
Griffith’s Cycle Corp., 15 R.P.C. 105, 106 (1898) (holding infringing the use of the  
mark KODAK for bicycles); Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) 
(ruling for the owner of YALE for locks when it opposed registration of YALE for batteries 
and flashlights)).  
 11. Schechter, supra note 10, at 821.  
 12. Id. at 824-30.  
 13. Id.
 14. Id. at 830-33. 
 15. While this mutation may seem odd, perhaps it is not as unusual as one might 
hope; it is an example of the long-standing problem of a rule being divorced from its 
rationale, and being unfortunately mutated in the process. See, e.g., Peaceable Planet, Inc. 
v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 989-90 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The scope of a rule is often and here 
limited by its rationale. Or, to make the same point differently, one way of going astray in 
legal analysis is to focus on the semantics of a rule rather than its purpose.”). 
 16. Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky 
Road, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 497 (2008).
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sence of competition or confusion, when the plaintiff showed a “like-
lihood of . . . dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark,” or a like-
lihood of injury to business reputation.17 Unlike Frank Schechter’s vi-
sion for dilution, the statutes did not replace confusion-based in-
fringement, nor were they limited to coined terms.18 These statutes 
provided broad protections and contained no limiting language about 
the means by which this dilution or reputational injury must be ac-
complished (such as a limitation to use of the plaintiff’s mark as de-
fendant’s own mark), and they provided no statutory defenses.19
 Variation in state laws increased over time, following two differ-
ent Model State Trademark Bills promulgated by the International 
Trademark Association (formerly the U.S. Trademark Association) in 
1964 and 1992.20 Still, the laws required only that the diluted mark 
be either distinctive (earlier laws) or famous (later laws), rather than 
fanciful or coined.21 The state laws also did not specify the types  
of uses of protected marks that would lead to liability (implying  
that all uses of a protected mark or a similar mark could create liabil-
ity) or provide statutory limitations on the actions (such as clear af-
firmative defenses).22
B.   1988: Failed Attempt at Federal Dilution Statute 
 Federal dilution law arose from a number of concerns. One fairly 
simple and understandable concern was the inconsistency in state 
laws. A trademark owner’s rights or, conversely, a new user’s rights 
to use a mark on noncompetitive goods, varied from state to state. Di-
lution protection existed in some but not all states, and protection 
differed even among states with a dilution action.23 This variance in-
                                                                                                                    
 17. Id.; David S. Welkowitz, State of the State: Is There a Future for State Dilution 
Laws, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 681, 683 (2008).  
 18. Bone, supra note 16, at 499 n.148; Welkowitz, supra note 17, at 683.  
 19. Courts, however, read limitations into the statutes. Welkowitz, supra note 17, at 
683-84 (noting that courts “often inserted a requirement of confusion into statutes that ex-
pressly disclaimed the need for it”).  
 20. Id. at 682-85; WELKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 11-21. A 1996 revision amended 
dilution provisions to reflect the 1995 FTDA. The antidilution provisions of the 1964 and 
1992 Model State Trademark Bills are reproduced in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS. See J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 22:8, 24:78-79
(4th ed. 2009). The most recent version of the Model State Trademark Bill, promulgated  
in 2007, seeks to harmonize state dilution laws with the federal dilution statute as 
amended in 2006. See http://www.inta.org (follow “Policy Development & Advocacy”  
link; then “Model Guidelines” link; then “Model State Trademark Bill” link) (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2010). 
 21.  WELKOWITZ, supra note 10 at 14-16.   
 22. See id. at 11-21.  
 23.  See Welkowitz, supra note 17, at 682-87, and sources cited therein. Welkowitz’s 
succinct observation is that after several states enacted the second Model State Trademark 
Bill (while other states retained their statutes under the first model), “there was now some 
differentiation among the state laws. Where once there were only laws giving injunctive re-
2010]                          A USE IN COMMERCE 343 
terfered with the Lanham Act’s stated goal of providing registered 
trademarks with uniform rights across the United States. From a 
trademark owner’s point of view, a strong justification for enacting a 
federal dilution statute was that the patchwork of state rights to pre-
vent dilution meant, in many cases, pursuing litigation in more than 
one state in order to gain injunctive relief effective in more than one 
state.24 Of course, for those who thought confusion-based trademark 
rights should be limited to competing goods and services, the pat-
chwork of rights was perhaps better than a uniform, strong right of 
trademark owners to bring dilution claims. 
 The first federal bill including a cause of action against trademark 
dilution came in 1987. At that time, Congress was considering a 
large-scale revision to the Lanham Act which would include the 
availability of intent-to-use applications in addition to use-based 
trademark applications and shorten the term of registration of a 
trademark from twenty years to ten years in order to reduce the 
number of inactive or abandoned marks on the register.25 The bill in-
troduced in the Senate in November 1987, Senate Bill 1883, included 
a cause of action to enjoin dilution.26 It would have added a new sub-
section to section 43 of the Lanham Act in which the right of action 
entitled an owner of a famous registered mark “subject to the prin-
ciples of equity, to an injunction against another person’s use in 
commerce of a mark, commencing after the registrant’s mark be-
comes famous, which causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the 
registrant’s mark” and gave seven nonexclusive factors that could be 
used to analyze the distinctiveness and fame of the mark.27 The bill 
defined dilution quite broadly: “the lessening of the distinctive quali-
ty of a famous mark through use of the mark by another person, re-
gardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the 
users of the mark, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception 
arising from that use.”28 It did not provide any statutory exclusions 
from liability.29
                                                                                                                    
lief for ‘likelihood of dilution,’ of (apparently) any distinctive mark, now there were a group 
of dilution laws protecting only ‘famous’ marks, with a definition, of sorts, of dilution, and 
allowing damages in certain cases.” Id. at 684-85. 
 24. See David S. Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State 
Antidilution Laws, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1, 81-84 (1992) (discussing the reasons a state’s 
antidilution laws should not be applied to conduct outside the state). 
 25. See 133 CONG. REC. 32812-13 (statement of Sen. DeConcini upon introducing  
the bill). 
 26. Id. at 32813.  
 27. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1987, S. 1883, 100th Cong. § 29 (as introduced on 
Nov. 19, 1987); 133 CONG. REC. 32816. 
 28. S. 1883 § 31; 133 CONG. REC. 32817. 
 29. The bill did provide for a defense to liability under state dilution laws:  
Ownership of a valid registration under the Act of 1881 or the Act of 1905 or on 
the principal register established herein shall be a complete bar to an action 
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 When the full Senate considered Senate Bill 1883 in May 1988, 
the scope of dilution liability had been narrowed somewhat through 
amendments reported by the Committee on the Judiciary.30 The ac-
tion for dilution remained “subject to the principles of equity,” and 
those principles of equity were to be applied “taking into account, 
among other things, the good faith use of an individual’s name or an 
indication of geographic origin.”31 The definition of dilution was only 
slightly narrowed, moving from the original “lessening of the distinc-
tive quality of a famous mark” to “material reduction of the distinc-
tive quality of a famous mark.”32 The overall effect of the changes, 
though, was to include minimal recognition that some arguably dilut-
ing uses of famous marks might need to be allowed based on certain 
policy interests—though the only interests specifically acknowledged 
were an individual’s interest in using his or her own name and the 
accurate application of a term used to indicate the geographic origin 
of goods or services. The Senate passed the amended version of the 
bill.33 Later, in September 1988, the Committee on the Judiciary is-
sued its report on the bill.34 The section-by-section analysis included 
in the report contained some interesting commentary: 
 Dilution occurs when a person adopts the mark of another for 
use as a trademark on noncompeting goods or services. Because 
the later user must be using the mark as a trademark on noncom-
peting goods or services, traditional trademark infringement ques-
tions such as likelihood of confusion and competition between the 
parties are not at issue. For these same reasons, concerns that a 
federal dilution provision will reach to the use of another’s trade-
mark in comparative advertising, satire, consumer reporting, and 
editorial comment are unfounded; by its nature, dilution does not 
and cannot reach to these “fair uses” of another’s trademark.35
 According to the report, then, the “special protection” given to in-
dividuals’ names and accurate use of geographic terms would apply 
even to use “as a trademark” and exclude those uses from liability.36
And anything other than use “as a trademark” would not give rise to 
dilution liability at all.37 Thus, the Committee’s report narrowed the 
                                                                                                                    
brought by another person, under the common law or statute of a State, 
seeking to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form  
of advertisement.  
S. 1883 § 29(c)(3); 133 CONG. REC. 32816. 
 30. 134 CONG. REC. 11069-75 (1988). 
 31. Id. at 11072. 
 32. Id. at 11073. 
 33. Id. at 11075. 
 34. S. REP. NO. 100-515 (1988). 
 35. Id. at 41. 
 36. Id. at 41-43. 
 37. See id.
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potentially vast breadth of the language of Senate Bill 1883’s dilution 
provision. The version of Senate Bill 1883 that ultimately passed 
both houses of Congress and became law in November 1988 did not, 
however, include any protection from dilution, either broad or nar-
row.38 Remarks made on the floor of the Senate after the House 
amendment was brought back to the Senate indicated significant 
disappointment with the House’s deletion of dilution from the bill:  
Although this was a somewhat controversial issue, the Senate had 
worked hard to come up with a carefully crafted compromise that 
we thought would be acceptable to all. By eliminating this section, 
the Federal Government loses the opportunity to provide guidance 
to those States that have dilution laws, and to create greater cer-
tainty in this area. 
. . . 
 Dilution is an important, developing area of the law. Eliminat-
ing this provision from the legislation will not eliminate the  
accompanying problems; they merely will have to be addressed in 
the future.39
 Federal legislative activity on dilution lay dormant until 1995, 
when a new trademark dilution bill was introduced in the House.40
That bill, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), en-
joyed a fairly rapid and uncomplicated trip through Congress, unlike 
the 1988 attempt at legislation.41
C.   1995: Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
 As introduced, House Bill 1295 entitled the owner of a famous reg-
istered trademark, subject to principles of equity, to “an injunction 
against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or 
trade name if such use begins after the registrant’s mark becomes 
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the regi-
strant’s mark.”42 The liability provision had changed little since the 
Senate’s 1988 version, but there were differences. First, the activity 
leading to liability became “commercial use in commerce of a mark” 
instead of mere “use in commerce of a mark.” Second, the specific 
                                                                                                                    
 38. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 39. 134 CONG. REC. 32053 (1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). Interestingly, a bill 
introduced in the House in March 1988 did include a dilution provision. H.R. 4156, 100th 
Cong. §29 (as introduced on Mar. 15, 1988). But by September, following markup in 
subcommittee (with the clean bill denominated House Bill 5372), the House trademark 
revision bill did not contain any mention of dilution. The House later amended the Senate 
Bill, S. 1883, which was the bill that passed both houses. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-1028 
at 3-7 (1988). 
 40. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, H.R. 1295, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 41. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat 985 (1996).  
 42. H.R. 1295 § 3(a)(c)(1) (as introduced on Mar. 22, 1995). 
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“principles of equity” that appeared in the last Senate dilution provi-
sion, a defendant’s use of his or her own name and the use of a geo-
graphic term to indicate origin, disappeared. Third, concerns about 
speech interests and legitimate comparative advertising led to the 
addition of two statutory exclusions from liability. Excluded from di-
lution liability were two types of uses of another’s trademark: “Fair 
use of a registrant’s mark by another person in comparative commer-
cial advertising or promotion to identify the registrant’s competing 
goods or services,” and “Noncommercial use of a mark.”43
 Interestingly, the concerns about overbreadth and the need for ex-
clusions from liability did not lead to an express statement that dilu-
tion liability would only extend to a defendant’s use of a famous mark 
“as a trademark on noncompeting goods or services,” as had been ex-
plained in the 1988 Senate Report.44 What constitutes use “as a 
trademark” as opposed to other types of use of a mark is difficult to 
define clearly and concisely.45 But that the House chose not to ex-
pressly limit dilution liability to use “as a trademark,” and instead 
provided two exclusions from liability, raises the question of whether 
the House in fact intended for its dilution provision to sweep more 
broadly than the 1988 Senate proposal, or at least was entirely indif-
ferent to its breadth.  
 Eight months after the bill’s introduction and referral to the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, House Bill 1295 was reported as 
amended, accompanied by a House Report.46 The amendments made 
the dilution cause of action applicable to both registered and unregis-
tered trademarks and added a third category of uses that would not 
be actionable, namely, “[a]ll forms of news reporting and news com-
mentary.”47 According to the House Report, the federal dilution cause 
of action aimed to protect famous marks from unauthorized uses that 
“reduce[] the public’s perception that the mark signifies something 
unique, singular, or particular.”48 The report acknowledged that dilu-
tion “recognizes the substantial investment the owner has made in 
the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself, pro-
tecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their 
                                                                                                                    
 43. Id. § 3(a)(c)(4)(A)-(B). 
 44. See S. REP. NO. 100-515, 41 (1988). 
 45. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use 
Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703, 1713-14 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Janis, Lessons]; 
Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 
775-76, 791-800 (2009); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over 
Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1641-57 (2007) [hereinafter 
Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion Over Use].
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995). 
 47. Id. at 2. 
 48. Id. at 3. 
2010]                          A USE IN COMMERCE 347 
own gain.”49 This language indicates that at least one member of the 
House intended a dilution claim to protect the mark owner’s proprie-
tary interests rather than to protect consumer interests or to prevent 
unfair competition. The exclusions from the scope of the claim—the 
fair use, news reporting, and noncommercial use exceptions—were 
explained only as follows: 
 The proposal adequately addresses legitimate First Amend-
ment concerns espoused by the broadcasting industry and the me-
dia. The bill will not prohibit or threaten “noncommercial” expres-
sion, as that term has been defined by the courts. Nothing in this 
bill is intended to alter existing case law on the subject of what 
constitutes “commercial” speech. The bill includes specific lan-
guage exempting from liability the “fair use” of a mark in the con-
text of comparative commercial advertising or promotion as well as 
all forms of news reporting and news commentary. The latter pro-
vision which was added to H.R. 1295 as a result of an amendment 
offered by Congressman Moorhead that was adopted by the Com-
mittee, recognizes the heightened First Amendment protection af-
forded the news industry.50
 In the section-by-section analysis in the report, the “use in com-
merce” language from the liability provision (“commercial use in 
commerce of a mark”) was explained by reference to the need for an 
interstate commerce nexus.51 The “commercial use” language, howev-
er, was not addressed at all.52 The section-by-section analysis also 
stated that the exceptions were 
designed to preclude the courts from enjoining speech that courts 
have recognized to be constitutionally protected. . . . [s]ection (4)(B) 
of the bill expressly incorporates the concept of “commercial” 
speech from the “commercial speech” doctrine, and proscribes dilu-
tion actions that seek to enjoin use of famous marks in “non-
commercial” uses (such as consumer product reviews).53
                                                                                                                    
 49. Id.
 50. Id. at 4. Although the author of these statements in the House Report may have 
believed that the bill “adequately addresse[d] legitimate First Amendment concerns,” 
scholars and others do not necessarily agree that federal dilution law, then or now, 
sufficiently protects expressive uses of marks. See, e.g., Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: 
Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 S. C. L. REV. 709 
(2007); Paul Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act—A Consumer Perspective, 16 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty 
Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008); see also 
Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 
(2003) (arguing that any restriction on use of a descriptive trademark is unconstitutional, 
including protection via infringement and dilution law). 
 51. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 at 7.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 8. 
348 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:337 
 The report provided no further explanation or elaboration on the 
exceptions. The report contains no explicit discussion of why, given 
the applicability of the cause of action only to “another person’s com-
mercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name,” a “noncommercial 
use” exception was deemed necessary.  
 On December 12, 1995, the bill as amended passed the House.54
Other than the remark by Representative Moorhead that “[t]he bill 
would not prohibit or threaten noncommercial expression, such as 
parody, satire, editorial, and other forms of expression that are not a 
part of a commercial transaction,” the House engaged in no further 
discussion of the First Amendment implications of the “noncommer-
cial use” exception or any other aspect of the bill.55 On December 29, 
1995, the Senate passed the amended bill without further modifica-
tion, with the only speech-related remark being Senator Leahy’s 
statement: “I am delighted that [the] bill now includes express refer-
ence to fair use, news reporting, and news commentary. I continue to 
believe, as our House colleagues also affirm, that parody, satire, edi-
torial, and other forms of expression will remain unaffected by this 
legislation.”56 In January 1996 President Clinton signed the FTDA, 
which was then codified at section 43(c) of the Lanham Act.57
D.   2006: Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
 In February 2005, Representative Lamar Smith introduced House 
Bill 683, which proposed to revise section 43(c) to “correct” a few as-
pects of the cause of action.58 Those corrections included revising  
the statutory language to reverse the effect of the Supreme Court’s 
2003 interpretation of section 43(c) in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 
Inc.59 In Moseley, the Court ruled that a trademark owner must  
prove actual dilution and cast doubt on whether the federal action 
covered tarnishment.60
 House Bill 683 responded to Moseley in two ways: making action-
able the likelihood of dilution rather than only actual dilution, and 
expressly including both blurring and tarnishment as viable theories 
of dilution under federal law.61 A third major element of the proposed 
revision, responsive to cases other than Moseley, aimed to narrow  
the field of trademarks included within the meaning of a “famous 
                                                                                                                    
 54. 141 CONG. REC. 36190 (1995). 
 55. Id. at 36189. 
 56. 141 CONG. REC. 38561 (1995). 
 57. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat 985 (1996) (approved Jan. 16, 1996).   
 58.  H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Rep. No. 109-23 at 5, 8 (2005). 
 59. 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003); H.R. Rep. No. 109-23 at 5. 
 60. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432.  
 61. H.R. 683 § 2; H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 5, 8. 
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mark,” eliminating niche fame and geographically limited fame.62
The revision also made clear that the field of eligible marks was 
broader than some courts had found in one respect: the revised lan-
guage protects both inherently distinctive marks and those with only 
acquired distinctiveness.63
 Representative Smith’s original 2005 bill changed only one aspect 
of the statutory exclusions from dilution liability: “Noncommercial 
use of a mark” became “Noncommercial use of a designation of 
source.”64 He did not provide an explanation of that change when he 
introduced the bill.65 The other statutory exclusions remained un-
changed. Soon thereafter, in March 2005, the House Committee on 
the Judiciary reported on the bill and recommended certain amend-
ments.66 The Committee significantly revised the exclusions section 
of the bill, with a stated reason being closer attention to First 
Amendment issues.67 As amended by the Committee, the exclusions 
section of the dilution statute did not contain the “noncommercial 
use” language; it read in its entirety: 
                                                                                                                    
 62. H.R. 683 § 2; H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 5, 8; cf. Jacob Jacoby, Considering the Who, 
What, When, Where and How of Measuring Dilution, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 601, 602-606 (2008) (arguing that some niche fame is still recognized). 
 63. The Second Circuit in particular had restricted the field of famous marks eligible 
for federal dilution protection only to famous, inherently distinctive marks. See, e.g.,
TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 64. H.R. 683 § 3(c)(3)(B) (as introduced on Feb. 9, 2005); H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 19. 
 65. Two participants in subcommittee hearings on House Bill 683 strongly disagree 
about the reasons for the change in language to “designation of source” in the original bill 
and the change back to “mark or trade name” in the version that became law. See William 
G. Barber, Dumping The “Designation of Source” Requirement From The TDRA: A Response 
To The Alleged “Trademark Use Requirement In Dilution Cases”, 24 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 559, 561-70 (2008) (arguing that dilution liability may be 
based on uses other than as a “designation of source,” and using the deletion of that 
language from the bill to support that construction); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 
The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 541, 552-53 (2008) (arguing that “designation of source” simply restated  
or clarified a trademark use requirement that existed under the FTDA and that the  
change back to “mark or trade name” has no significance and retains a trademark  
use requirement). 
 66.  H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 1.  
 67. See id. at 25 (prepared statement of Rep. Howard Berman).  
[A]n amendment was adopted in Subcommittee to address the First 
Amendment and free speech issues that were raised at the hearing. The ACLU 
voiced concerns about the possibility that critics could be stifled by the threat of 
an injunction for mere likelihood of tarnishment. Furthermore, they were 
concerned with the balance between the rights of trademark holders and the 
First Amendment. ACLU joined with INTA [International Trademark 
Association, an organization composed primarily of trademark owners] and 
AIPLA [American Intellectual Property Law Association, an organization of 
intellectual-property attorneys] in crafting a separate exemption from a 
dilution cause of action for parody, comment and criticism.  
Id. The Subcommittee to which Berman refers, whose amendments were accepted by the 
whole Committee, is the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property. 
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(3) Exclusions.—The following shall not be actionable as dilution 
by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: 
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative 
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing 
goods or services of the owner of the famous mark. 
(B) Fair use of a famous mark by another person, other than as a 
designation of source for the person’s goods or services, including 
for purposes of identifying and parodying, criticizing, or comment-
ing upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the 
famous mark owner. 
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.68
When the full House considered the amended bill, Representative 
Berman stated on the floor that the bill  
manages to balance trademark law with [F]irst [A]mendment con-
cerns.  
. . . .
[And it] has now garnered the support of the ACLU for accommo-
dating its [F]irst [A]mendment concerns. In section 2(c)(3), the bill 
addresses the balance between the rights of trademark holders 
and the [F]irst [A]mendment by providing an exemption for pur-
poses of identifying and parodying, criticizing or commenting on 
the famous mark.69
The House passed the amended bill and forwarded it to the Senate 
for consideration.70
 In March 2006, the Senate passed the bill, but with its own 
amendments.71 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary revised the 
exclusions to read as follows: 
(3) Exclusions.—The following shall not be actionable as dilution 
by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: 
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or 
facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person 
other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or 
services, including use in connection with— 
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare 
goods or services; or 
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the 
famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark 
owner. 
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. 
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.72
                                                                                                                    
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 2. 
 69. 151 CONG. REC. H2123 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005). But see sources cited supra note 50. 
 70. 151 CONG. REC. H2123 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005).   
 71. 152 CONG. REC. S1923 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006). 
 72. Id. at S1922. 
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 The Committee did not issue a written report addressing its 
changes, but on the floor, Senator Leahy explained the change to the 
exclusions by stating, “Senator Hatch and I were successful in includ-
ing language that definitively shelters important constitutionally 
protected [F]irst [A]mendment freedoms from being caught up in the 
liability net.”73 The Senate passed the bill by unanimous consent, and 
no other concerns were raised on the record with respect to First 
Amendment issues.74
 When the House accepted the Senate’s amendments in September 
2006,  Representative Sensenbrenner noted that the amended bill 
“creates a free-speech exclusion for noncommercial use of a mark,”75
and Representative Smith stated that the “amendments developed by 
the subcommittee and the other body will more clearly protect tradi-
tional [F]irst [A]mendment uses, such as parody and criticism.”76 The 
only Representative speaking against the bill was David Wu of Ore-
gon.77 Representative Wu’s remarks focused on small businesses, 
voicing concern that the bill would allow large companies to more 
easily sue individuals and small businesses even when harm was not 
apparent.78 President Bush signed the bill, known as the Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act (TDRA), on October 6, 2006.79
 In the FTDA, applying the common meaning of “commercial use in 
commerce” and “noncommercial use” resulted in a complete contra-
diction between the prima facie case and the noncommercial use ex-
clusion. The legislative history, on the other hand, provided a mean-
ing of “noncommercial use” that fit well within the context of the sta-
tute—a use other than in commercial speech. The TDRA’s amend-
ments to the exclusions in section 43(c), including revisions consi-
dered and rejected in favor of further amendments, left the language 
“noncommercial use of a mark” from the FTDA intact, adding only 
the term “any” before it. With no indication in either the statutory 
text or the legislative history that the meaning of “noncommercial 
use” changed from the FTDA,80 the speech-protective meaning still 
holds following reinsertion of the exclusion in the TDRA. 
                                                                                                                    
 73. Id. at S1923. 
 74. See id. at S1921-23. 
 75. 152 CONG. REC. H6964 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2006).  
 76. Id. at H6965. 
 77. See id. at H6963-65. 
 78. Id. at H6965. Rep. Wu’s only comment that might shade toward a speech concern, 
as opposed to a concern for the change from actual dilution to likelihood of dilution was 
this: “[W]e run the risk of trademark owners being able to lock up large portions of our 
shared language. This . . . is especially troubling at a time when even colors and common 
words can be granted trademark protection.” Id. But overall, his concerns with the bill did 
not appear to be grounded in the First Amendment. 
 79. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125). 
 80. In fact, all indications are that the exclusion was reinserted specifically to bolster 
speech protection, which reinforces the retention of the meaning “a use other than in 
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III.   ”NONCOMMERCIAL USE” IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT CONTEXT
 Before delving further into the connection between commercial 
speech doctrine and trademark dilution, it is helpful to briefly ad-
dress the broader question of the interplay between trademark law 
and the First Amendment. Trademark law provides for private civil 
actions by trademark owners, while the First Amendment by its ex-
press language forbids direct governmental regulation of speech. But 
trademark law does not escape First Amendment scrutiny simply by 
coming in the form of a private action rather than direct governmen-
tal regulation.81 The First Amendment constrains not only explicit 
state and federal regulations of speech but also the availability of 
speech-restrictive private civil actions under state or federal law.82
And although decisions exist that immunize trademark law from se-
rious First Amendment scrutiny on the basis that trademarks are 
“property,”83 those decisions have been persuasively discredited by 
scholars84 and do not appear to significantly influence courts today.85
                                                                                                                    
commercial speech.” See 152 CONG. REC. S1923 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of  
Sen. Leahy). 
 81. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (applying the First 
Amendment to a libel action). 
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts 
have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid 
restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters  
not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law 
only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the form in which state 
power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact 
been exercised. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First 
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-5, 7 (2001) (noting that governmental 
enforcement of various private actions is restrained by the First Amendment). 
 82. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 81, at 4-5, 7; see also Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The
Myth of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine as a Protector of Free Speech, 24 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31 (2007) (explaining the parallel interaction between the 
First Amendment and private copyright actions); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First 
Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. Rev. 381, 385, 407-08 (2008) (agreeing 
that trademark law is and should be restrained by the First Amendment and providing an 
extended argument for her position, but also discussing a few recent cases discounting 
First Amendment challenges and even denying the presence of state action).  
 83. See, e.g., Reddy Commc’ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
630, 633-34, 636 (D.D.C. 1977) (refusing to entertain defendant’s First Amendment defense 
to a trademark infringement action by analogizing to Supreme Court decisions allowing 
owners of private property to refuse to allow picketers to use the property, but denying the 
trademark owner’s request for a preliminary injunction on other grounds); Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing 
private property cases to reject the defendant’s First Amendment argument on the ground 
that “adequate alternative avenues of communication exist” (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972))). 
 84. See generally Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional 
Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L.
REV. 158.  
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The First Amendment can be used to refine trademark law, and Con-
gress did just that in drawing from commercial speech doctrine to de-
fine the extent of the noncommercial use exclusion. 
A.   The Operation of Separate Commercial Speech Protection 
 In providing an exclusion from dilution liability for noncommercial 
uses, section 43(c) relies on the distinction in First Amendment juri-
sprudence between “commercial speech” and other speech, which 
might therefore be termed “noncommercial speech.” The structure of 
that distinction and the meaning of “commercial speech” within that 
body of law thus governs the construction of section 43(c).  
 Space does not allow a full discussion of First Amendment theory 
and practice since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, or even a com-
plete review of the history of commercial speech protection.86 In brief, 
the Supreme Court significantly strengthened constitutional protec-
tion for expressive activities over the middle of the twentieth century. 
Most of the Court’s cases during this time related to noncommercial 
or “core” speech. Commercial speech began to gain traction as a form 
of speech worthy of protection in the early 1970s.87 The Supreme 
Court’s clearest pronouncement of constitutional protection for com-
mercial speech arrived in 1976, with the decision in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.88 The 
Court varies the level of First Amendment protection provided to 
speech depending on how the speech itself is classified.89 Speech clas-
sified as “commercial” enjoys somewhat less protection than non-
commercial speech.90
                                                                                                                    
 85. See Kerry L. Timbers & Julia Huston, The “Artistic Relevance Test” Just Became 
Relevant: The Increasing Strength of the First Amendment as a Defense to Trademark 
Infringement and Dilution, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1278, 1278-79, 1282-98 (2003) (discussing 
developments in the law from 1989 through 2003 to support the claim that the “Second, 
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have all expressly rejected the alternative avenues 
test” in trademark cases); But see San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic 
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536 (1987) (ruling, in the trademark-analogous case of a special 
federal statute protecting the word “Olympic,” the five-interlocking-ring Olympic logo, and 
other devices, that the statute did not infringe upon protected rights of speech in part 
because “[b]y prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, neither Congress nor 
the USOC has prohibited the [defendant] from conveying its message”). For further 
discussion of the “Olympic” case, see infra notes 95, 196. 
 86. For more on the history of commercial speech protection, written for the purpose 
of addressing the place of trademarks and trademark law within that body of 
jurisprudence, see Ramsey, supra note 50. See also Ramsey, supra note 82; Rebecca 
Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737 (2007). 
 87. See Ramsey, supra note 50, at 1130-34; see also Ramsey, supra note 82, at 390-95; 
Tushnet, supra note 86, at 744-47. 
 88. 425 U.S. 748, 770-72 (1976). 
 89. See Ramsey, supra note 50 at 1131-32. 
 90. Id.
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 Courts review regulations of commercial and noncommercial 
speech using different standards. Under Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, a regulation on commercial 
speech that is not false or misleading must directly advance a sub-
stantial governmental interest and be no more extensive than neces-
sary to serve that interest.91 For noncommercial speech, the validity 
of a speech regulation depends on the nature of the regulation. Con-
tent-based restrictions on noncommercial speech must be necessary 
to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored 
to achieve that interest.92 A content-neutral time, place, or manner 
restriction on noncommercial speech, on the other hand, undergoes a 
less rigorous analysis than a content-based restriction. The regula-
tion must be “justified without reference to the content” of the 
speech, “narrowly tailored to a significant governmental interest,” 
and it must “leave open ample alternative channels” for the expres-
sion.93 And a valid regulation on conduct that includes expressive 
elements must otherwise fall within the valid powers of the govern-
ment, further a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression, and contain only an incidental restric-
tion on freedom of speech that is not greater than essential to further 
the government’s nonspeech interest.94
 Comparing commercial speech analysis to the varied noncommer-
cial speech analyses demonstrates that while the treatment of com-
mercial speech regulations is certainly close to that applied to content-
neutral time, place, or manner regulations and expressive conduct 
regulations, it is not identical.95 Content may play a role in restrictions 
                                                                                                                    
 91. 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the 
government’s power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial 
interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover  
the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation 
on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal. 
Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the 
restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation 
may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the 
government’s purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as 
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive 
restrictions cannot survive. 
Id. 
 92. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
 93. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 94. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 95. Cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 
536-37 (1987) (asking whether a federal restriction on use of the word “Olympic,” 
enforceable by the USOC, survived First Amendment review by asking “whether the 
incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to further 
a substantial governmental interest”). 
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on commercial speech. Also, no alternate communications channel 
analysis is required for commercial speech regulations, as it is with 
time, place, or manner restrictions on noncommercial speech.96
B.   Drawing the Commercial-Noncommercial Line 
 Reliance on the commercial-noncommercial distinction, whether in 
a First Amendment context or in the context of the noncommercial 
use exclusion for federal dilution actions, means that where the line 
is drawn to separate commercial from noncommercial speech has 
great significance. Complicating the line-drawing is the existence of 
speech containing both commercial and noncommercial elements. 
Courts applying the commercial speech doctrine have dealt with this 
problem of mixed speech in a variety of circumstances.  
 In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court treated an advertisement for an 
abortion-provider referral service as protected speech without catego-
rizing that advertisement as either commercial or noncommercial 
speech.97 It did not focus on the advertisement’s strongly commercial 
elements, even though earlier Court decisions excepted commercial 
advertisements from First Amendment protections.98 The opinion  
addressed the effect of the commercial nature of the advertisement  
as follows: 
                                                                                                                    
A restriction on nonmisleading commercial speech may be justified if the 
government’s interest in the restriction is substantial, directly advances the 
government’s asserted interest, and is not more extensive than necessary to 
serve the interest. Both this test and the test for a time, place or manner 
restriction under O’Brien require a balance between the governmental interest 
and the magnitude of the speech restriction. Because their application to these 
facts is substantially similar, they will be discussed together. 
Id. at 537 n.16 (citations omitted). The Court explained its use of O’Brien as opposed to a 
stricter mode of scrutiny: 
 By prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, neither 
Congress nor the USOC has prohibited the SFAA from conveying its message. . 
. . Nor is it clear that [the law] restricts purely expressive uses of the word 
“Olympic.” [It] restricts only the manner in which the SFAA may convey its 
message. The restrictions on expressive speech properly are characterized as 
incidental to the primary congressional purpose of encouraging and rewarding 
the USOC’s activities. 
Id. at 536. 
 96. See Lockridge, supra note 82, at 43-45, 47. 
 97. 421 U.S. 809, 818, 822-26 (1975). 
 98. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“This court has 
unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of 
communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and 
municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may 
not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are 
equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects 
purely commercial advertising.”). 
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 The fact that the particular advertisement in appellant’s news-
paper had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s  
commercial interests did not negate all First Amendment guaran-
tees. The State was not free of constitutional restraint merely  
because the advertisement involved sales or “solicitations,” or  
because appellant was paid for printing it, or because appellant’s 
motive or the motive of the advertiser may have involved financial 
gain. The existence of commercial activity, in itself, is no justifica-
tion for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the  
First Amendment. 
 . . . . 
 . . . The advertisement published in appellant’s newspaper did 
more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained 
factual material of clear “public interest.” Portions of its message, 
most prominently the lines, “Abortions are now legal in New York. 
There are no residency requirements,” involve the exercise of the 
freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion.99
 In minimizing the commerciality of the ad and emphasizing its so-
cial or public-interest elements, the Court indicated that not all ad-
vertisements were equal in its eyes for First Amendment purposes. 
In the Court’s words, “[t]he diverse motives, means, and messages  
of advertising may make speech ‘commercial’ in widely varying  
degrees.”100 The Court made it clear that speech with commercial  
motives might well be fully protected in certain circumstances, name-
ly when the speech combines commercial activity with material of 
public interest.101
 The year after Bigelow, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the 
Court again avoided defining “commercial speech” as such, although 
it clearly brought commercial speech within the protective umbrella 
of the First Amendment.102 The Court characterized the speech at is-
sue as “speech which does no more than propose a commercial trans-
action.”103 The Court also identified two “commonsense differences” 
between commercial speech and other protected speech to justify the 
separation of commercial from noncommercial speech.104 First, it ob-
served that commercial speech is more objective than noncommercial 
speech, asserting that in commercial speech truth and falsity are 
more easily verified.105 Second, the Court noted that commercial 
                                                                                                                    
 99. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818, 822 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 100. Id. at 826. 
 101. Id.
 102. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
762-65 (1976). 
 103. Id. at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 
U.S. 376, at 385 (1973).  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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speech, because it is motivated by profit, should have greater durabil-
ity, or “hardiness” than noncommercial speech.106
 In the 1980 case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission, the Court created an analytical framework  
for commercial speech protection.107 But it did not provide much  
assistance in identifying “commercial speech” in the first instance. 
The Court variously defined “commercial speech” as narrowly as 
“speech proposing a commercial transaction”108 and as broadly as 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience.”109
 Very shortly after Central Hudson, the Court issued its decision in 
Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment.110 In 
Schaumberg, the Court treated solicitation of funds for charitable 
purposes as speech fully protected by the First Amendment.111 In so 
doing, the Court made the following statements about speech with a 
mixture of commercial and noncommercial elements:  
 Prior authorities . . . clearly establish that charitable appeals 
for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech 
interests—communication of information, the dissemination and 
propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes—that 
are within the protection of the First Amendment. Soliciting finan-
cial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but 
the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that 
solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and 
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or 
for particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and  
for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such informa-
tion and advocacy would likely cease. Canvassers in such contexts 
are necessarily more than solicitors for money. Furthermore, be-
cause charitable solicitation does more than inform private eco-
nomic decisions and is not primarily concerned with providing  
information about the characteristics and costs of goods and ser-
vices, it has not been dealt with in our cases as a variety of purely 
commercial speech.112
 Three years after Schaumberg classified certain mixed speech as 
fully protected, the Court classified other mixed speech as commer-
cial speech subject to less First Amendment protection. It used an al-
ternate paradigm, ignoring the “intertwined” nature of the mixed 
                                                                                                                    
 106. Id.
 107. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see also supra note 91. 
 108. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
 109. Id. at 561-62. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens noted and criticized the wide 
gulf between the two definitions. Id. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 110. 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
 111. Id. at 639.   
 112. Id. at 632. 
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speech that was the focus of Schaumberg. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp.,113 the Court held that when speech does more than 
propose a commercial transaction, thus falling outside the narrowest 
definition, it may still be “commercial speech” based upon a combina-
tion of elements: presentation in an advertising form, reference to a 
specific product, and a speaker’s economic motivation.114 These ele-
ments echo the Bigelow statement that the commerciality of an ad-
vertisement will vary as a result of “diverse motives, means, and 
messages.”115 Under Bolger, not all speech related to commerce will 
be treated as commercial speech, although some will.  
 National Federation of the Blind v. Riley, decided five years later, 
hearkened back to Schaumberg rather than Bolger, although the 
Court modified the language it used to characterize protected mixed 
speech.116 The Schaumberg Court fully protected the speech where 
the commercial and noncommercial elements were “characteristically 
intertwined.”117 In Riley, however, the Court gave full speech protec-
tion to partially commercial speech due to the “inextricably intert-
wined” nature of certain commercial and noncommercial speech ele-
ments.118 In that case, the state regulation being challenged required 
professional fundraisers involved in charitable solicitation to disclose 
certain financial information to potential donors before making an 
appeal for funds.119 The noncommercial, fully protected speech of cha-
ritable solicitation was therefore judged to be “inextricably intert-
wined” with the mandated commercial speech, leading to full protec-
tion for all of the speech.120
 This use of the term “inextricably” in Riley (versus Schaumberg’s 
“characteristically”) led in no small part to the decision one year later 
in Board of Trustees v. Fox.121 In Fox, the Court declined to provide 
full First Amendment protection, instead giving the somewhat lower 
                                                                                                                    
 113. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). The defendant condom manufacturer had distributed 
pamphlets, some of which discussed venereal disease and condom use at length, and 
included the defendant’s name and identified its condom brand only at the bottom of the 
last page of the eight-page pamphlet. Id. at 62 n.4. These pamphlets were not, then, merely 
proposals to engage in commercial transactions, but yet the Court characterized the 
defendant’s speech as commercial speech. Id. at 66-68. The Court explained the 
characterization by noting that the pamphlets (a) were conceded to be advertisements 
disseminated in return for payment of money, (b) referenced a specific product, and (c) 
were mailed with an economic motive. Id. at 66-67. The Court stated that while speech 
bearing only one of those characteristics would not be commercial speech, speech bearing a 
combination of all of those characteristics was commercial speech. Id. at 67. 
 114. Id. at 67. 
 115. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975). 
 116. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 117. Vill. of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).  
 118. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. 
 119. Id. at 795. 
 120. Id. at 796. 
 121. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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Central Hudson-level protection, to “Tupperware parties” in universi-
ty dormitories on the basis that 
the AFS “Tupperware parties” the students seek to hold “propose a 
commercial transaction,” which is the test for identifying commer-
cial speech. They also touch on other subjects, however, such as 
how to be financially responsible and how to run an efficient home. 
Relying on [Riley], respondents contend that here pure speech and 
commercial speech are “inextricably intertwined,” and that the en-
tirety must therefore be classified as noncommercial. We disagree. 
 . . . [In Riley], of course, the commercial speech (if it was that) 
was “inextricably intertwined” because the state law required it to 
be included. By contrast, there is nothing whatever “inextricable” 
about the noncommercial aspects of these presentations. No law of 
man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without 
teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without  
selling housewares.122
 The Supreme Court’s varied descriptions of the nature of commer-
cial speech have left the lower courts with a number of analytical 
tools to apply in categorizing speech. The Courts of Appeals have 
dealt with speech presenting both commercial and noncommercial 
elements in several ways. The Ninth Circuit has, at times, relied on 
the Riley and Fox language of speech that is “inextricably intert-
wined.” For example, in Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. City and 
County of San Francisco, several nonprofit organizations claimed 
that their sales of t-shirts and other merchandise merited full First 
Amendment protection because the items were emblazoned with core 
speech, namely political, religious, and philosophical messages.123 The 
Ninth Circuit utilized Fox, Riley, and Schaumberg to decide the 
case.124 It held that because the merchandise was sold “in order to 
disseminate [the] organizations’ message[s],” the activity of selling 
communicative merchandise was, as a whole, noncommercial and ful-
ly protected, even though the sales activity was commercial.125
“Where the pure speech and commercial speech by the nonprofits 
during these activities is inextricably intertwined, the entirety must 
be classified as noncommercial and we must apply the test for fully 
protected speech.”126 The court did not refuse to find the speech to be 
inextricably intertwined with the commercial sales simply because 
the organizations could have disseminated their news through free 
                                                                                                                    
 122. Id. at 473-74 (citations omitted). 
 123. 952 F.2d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 124.  Id. at 1064.  
 125. Id.
 126. Id.
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distribution of printed material rather than through the commercial 
sale of goods.127
 The Ninth Circuit again used the intertwined nature of commer-
cial and communicative elements, as well as the Bolger model of 
weighing varied speech characteristics, in a right of publicity and 
Lanham Act false endorsement action brought by actor Dustin Hoff-
man against a magazine.128 Hoffman objected to an altered photo-
graph showing his “Tootsie” character dressed in a designer gown 
and shoes different than the gown and shoes shown in the original 
photograph, when that photograph was used as part of an article 
touting new designer fashions.129 Another portion of the magazine 
provided stores and prices for the gown and shoes in the photograph, 
and at least one of the featured designers also advertised in that 
magazine issue.130
 In granting full First Amendment protection to the article and 
photograph, the appellate court disagreed with the district court’s as-
sessment that the article was pure commercial speech.131 It began 
with the premise, taken from Bolger and Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy, that the “core notion of commercial speech is that it does 
no more than propose a commercial transaction.”132 It continued its 
analysis by examining the mixture of commercial and noncommercial 
elements within the article and accompanying photographs: 
If the altered photograph had appeared in a [designer’s] adver-
tisement, then we would be facing [purely commercial speech]. But 
[the defendant] did not use Hoffman’s image in a traditional ad-
vertisement printed merely for the purpose of selling a particular 
product. . . . Nor did the article simply advance a commercial mes-
sage. . . . Viewed in context, the article as a whole is a combination 
of fashion photography, humor, and visual and verbal editorial 
comment on classic films and famous actors. Any commercial as-
pects are “inextricably entwined” with expressive elements, and so 
they cannot be separated out “from the fully protected whole.” 
“[T]here are commonsense differences between speech that does no 
                                                                                                                    
 127. Compare this reasoning to Fox, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court stressed that 
because the commercial and noncommercial elements of speech in that case were not 
“inextricably intertwined,” the speech regulation would be treated as a commercial speech 
regulation for First Amendment purposes. 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989). If the Ninth Circuit 
had focused on Fox alone, rather than the broader and more nuanced analysis represented 
by Fox, Riley, and Schaumberg taken together (not to mention Bigelow and Bolger), it 
might have found the speech to be unprotected. Courts interpreting the noncommercial use 
exclusion in trademark dilution should, as I argue above, take just such a broader view. 
 128. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 129. Id. at 1183. 
 130. Id. at 1185.   
 131. Id. at 1184-85.   
 132. Id. at 1184 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
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more than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties,” 
and common sense tells us this is not a simple advertisement. 
 The district court also concluded that the article was not pro-
tected speech because it was created to attract attention. A printed 
article meant to draw attention to the for-profit magazine in which 
it appears . . . does not fall outside of the protection of the First 
Amendment because it may help to sell copies.133
The court did not ask whether the magazine could have written an 
article commenting on classic films and famous actors without intro-
ducing a commercial element, such as the display of current designer 
fashions, or whether the display of current designer fashions itself 
deserved full First Amendment protection. Instead, it focused on 
whether the blending of commercial and noncommercial elements in 
the article and photograph created a noncommercial whole.134 The 
Ninth Circuit ruled that it did.135
 In a case involving sales of t-shirts printed with messages—
somewhat factually similar to one of the Ninth Circuit cases dis-
cussed above—the Seventh Circuit found the sale of the shirts to con-
stitute a fully protected speech interest despite the mixture of com-
mercial and noncommercial elements.136 And it did so almost without 
acknowledging the mixed nature of the speech. The City of Chicago 
tried to use its “Peddlers’ Ordinance” to prevent an advocate of mari-
juana legalization from selling message-laden shirts within certain 
districts of the city, which included Grant Park and its surrounds.137
In affirming a preliminary injunction allowing the sale of the shirts 
pending further adjudication of the constitutionality of the statute, 
the court stated, without directly utilizing any of the foregoing 
mixed-speech analysis, as follows:  
 The T-shirts that the plaintiff sells carry an extensive written 
message of social advocacy; they are the equivalent of the sand-
wich boards that union pickets sometimes wear. . . . [T]here is  
no question that the T-shirts are a medium of expression prima fa-
cie protected by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment, 
and they do not lose their protection by being sold rather than  
given away. 
 . . . . 
                                                                                                                    
 133. Id. at 1185-86 (quoting Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City & County of San 
Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990); Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976)) (citations omitted). 
 134. Id. at 1186. 
 135. Id. Once again, nuanced attention to the Supreme Court’s First Amendment  
jurisprudence––looking at a range of cases rather than isolated statements, guided the 
court’s decision. 
 136. Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 137. Id. at 1012.  
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 To argue that the right of free speech is limited to cases  
in which speech is disseminated free of charge would amount  
to arguing that the City of Chicago could ban the sale of newspa-
pers. . . . Just as the publishers of newspapers defray a portion of 
their costs by the sale of their papers, so [the advocacy group]  
defrays a portion and perhaps the entirety of its costs by the sale 
of its T-shirts, which are . . . the vehicle of [the advocate’s] ideas 
and opinions.138
 Other appellate courts have applied Bolger with some elaboration 
when analyzing mixed speech, leaving out the Fox, Riley, and 
Schaumberg “intertwined” analysis. The Fifth Circuit, in Procter & 
Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., asked whether a primary purpose of the 
speech at issue was commercial or noncommercial.139 The Tenth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Wenger140 looked at the Bolger characteristics 
as well as whether the speech at issue was “grounded in commercial 
transactions of the kind that the state has traditionally regulated.”141
It emphasized the relationship of commercial speech regulation to 
traditional economic regulation, using that relationship to aid in 
identifying commercial speech.142 “The distinction between commer-
                                                                                                                    
 138. Id. at 1014, 1017. 
 139. 242 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2001). 
The question whether an economic motive existed is more than a question 
whether there was an economic incentive for the speaker to make the speech; 
the Bolger test also requires that the speaker acted substantially out of 
economic motivation. Thus, for example, speech that is principally based on 
religious or political convictions, but which may also benefit the speaker 
economically, would fall short of the requirement that the speech was 
economically motivated. 
 . . . . 
This does not mean that whenever the primary motivation for speech is 
economic, the speech is commercial. . . . . The difference between commercial 
speech and noncommercial speech is, after all, “a matter of degree.” 
Id. at 552-53 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 
(1993)). The Procter & Gamble decision addressed the proper treatment of mixed speech in 
the context of a Lanham Act false advertising claim based on admittedly false statements 
about Procter & Gamble made by an Amway distributor. Id.. at 542-546. The status of the 
distributor’s speech within the First Amendment hierarchy mattered, according to the 
court, because the constitutional burden of proof for liability based on false statements 
(from strict liability to liability only upon proof of actual malice) varies with the status of 
the speech. Id. at 547. The court utilized the characteristics differentiating commercial 
from noncommercial speech in determining the proper treatment of the mixed speech at 
issue, and it found some of those characteristics to be helpful: durability of the speech due 
to economic motivation, and verifiability of the truthfulness of the speech. See id. at 550-
51. In this case, the court appears to have been willing to engage in the convoluted exercise 
of sorting out commercial from noncommercial speech and applying the Supreme Court’s 
standards for burdens of proof (also including public figure versus private figure 
considerations) because it found significant value in maintaining the ability of private 
parties to tightly regulate false commercial speech. Id. at 547-59.  
 140.   427 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005).  
 141. Id. at 848 (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979)).  
 142. Id. at 847.   
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cial and non-commercial speech rests on the ‘common-sense’ grounds 
that the former ‘occurs in an area traditionally subject to government 
regulation.’ . . . ‘[T]he State’s power to regulate commercial transac-
tions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial speech 
that is linked inextricably to those transactions.’ “143
 In sum, lower courts, and even the Supreme Court, select among 
the speech-categorizing analytical tools in order to match the speech 
and its regulatory context. All of the analytical tools examine the 
content of the speech, not just its form. And in all of these analyses, a 
mixture of commercial and communicative motives and elements can 
support noncommercial speech status.  
 The governmental justification for regulating the speech also 
plays a role. The “core” of commercial speech is the proposition of a 
commercial transaction, and it is this core that has been used to jus-
tify its greater regulation than other types of speech. Trademark law 
purports to affect not the ultimate commercial transaction, but only a 
commercially communicative aspect of a transaction—the source-
identification aspect. As such, care needs to be taken to ensure that 
trademark dilution law does not overreach beyond regulating the 
core commercial communication, as it would then begin to improperly 
restrain noncommercial speech.144
 When giving meaning to the noncommercial use exclusion in the 
trademark dilution context, several options are available—but all in-
dicate that mixed motives would not disqualify a use from the exclu-
sion. And the content of the use should matter, not just the form in 
which the use appears, such as on a commercially marketed product 
or service. Courts applying the noncommercial use exclusion should 
carefully consider the nuanced analysis of commercial speech and its 
regulation, as set forth in this Article. If they do so, they should see 
that the noncommercial use exclusion includes mixed speech – rather 
                                                                                                                    
 143. Id. at 846 (quoting 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996); 
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)). The Wenger court elected to apply intermediate, 
Central Hudson-level scrutiny to a compelled statement (requiring disclosure when a 
person is touting a stock if consideration of any kind will be or has been paid to the person) 
because the compelled statement arose in the context of speech related to commercial stock 
transactions. Id. at 846-47. The court explained:  
Common sense suggests that [the speech] is primarily akin to commercial 
advertising and subject to less protection than purely information-based speech.  
. . . .  
 Although there are some elements of entertainment and information 
contained in the [communications], they do little more than propose a commercial 
transaction, namely, the purchase of shares in a company.  
Id. at 847. 
 144. See infra Part IV.A. 
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than leaving that speech in an indeterminate status or wholly within 
the scope of dilution liability.145
IV.   THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE EXCLUSION
 Part II of this Article presented the legislative history of the 
FTDA and TDRA, replete with references to using the noncommer-
cial use exclusion to protect expressive uses from dilution liability. 
Part III explained how the commercial-noncommercial speech dis-
tinction operates in First Amendment law. Here, Part IV discusses 
how and why the noncommercial use exclusion should be interpreted 
and applied based on the commercial-noncommercial distinction from 
First Amendment jurisprudence. This interpretation of the exclusion 
makes the entire statute both more predictable and consistent with 
the intent of Congress.  
 Part IV begins by examining court decisions that properly applied 
the exclusion. It then discusses how interpreting the exclusion broad-
ly, consistent with the understanding of “noncommercial” developed 
in First Amendment jurisprudence, helps to protect the TRDA as a 
whole from being invalidated as an unconstitutional restraint on ex-
pression. Finally, it responds to certain objections to using the non-
commercial use exclusion as an affirmative defense that limits dilu-
tion liability to commercial speech.  
A.   ”Noncommercial Use” as a Broad Category Including Mixed 
Speech 
 Several well-reasoned decisions within the Ninth Circuit have in-
terpreted the noncommercial use exclusion to mean that use of a 
mark in mixed speech is exempt from dilution liability, rather than 
restricting the exclusion to speech that is entirely noncommercial. 
This is the only interpretation of the statute that is consistent with 
the legislative history of federal dilution laws, taken together with 
the range of First Amendment jurisprudence. If other courts adopt a 
similarly broad application of the exclusion, it will provide more pre-
dictable results in litigation and an earlier end to dilution claims in 
appropriate cases.  
 In the first reported decision applying the exclusion, Dr. Seuss En-
terprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., the District Court for the 
Southern District of California rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
a use was commercial within the meaning of the dilution exclusion.146
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s use of the Seuss 
marks (primarily, a drawing of a person that was reminiscent of the 
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 146. 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D. Cal. 1996). 
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Cat in the Hat, including the striped stovepipe hat claimed by Seuss 
as a separate mark) was not a “noncommercial [use] because the 
marks were used to ‘make their book more entertaining and to conse-
quently, sell more copies.’ “147 The court referred to both the legisla-
tive history of the dilution statute and Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy to conclude that “an expressive use is not rendered commercial 
by the impact of the use on sales.”148 As a result, the court found the 
use was “noncommercial” and therefore within the noncommercial 
use exclusion.149 The court did not expressly address “mixed” speech, 
but its reasoning acknowledged that some uses with commercial cha-
racteristics should still fall within the exclusion.150
 Five years later, the Ninth Circuit properly interpreted the non-
commercial use exclusion to protect mixed speech. Mattel, Inc., owner 
of rights to the BARBIE trademark, sued MCA Records over the use 
of “Barbie” in the song “Barbie Girl,”151 alleging both trademark in-
fringement and trademark dilution.152 The Ninth Circuit decided 
Mattel’s trademark dilution claim by applying the noncommercial 
use exclusion.153 The court explored the plain language and the legis-
                                                                                                                    
 147. Id. (citation omitted). 
 148. Id. The court cited Senator Hatch’s statement upon introducing the bill that the 
noncommercial use exclusion included “parody, satire, editorial and other forms of 
expression that are not part of a commercial transaction,” and the Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy definition of commercial speech as speech that, according to this court, “merely 
proposes a commercial transaction.” Id. (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); 141 CONG. REC. 38559 (1995) (statement 
of Sen. Hatch)). 
 149. Id. The district court nevertheless issued a preliminary injunction based on the 
plaintiff’s copyright and trademark infringement claims, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
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Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 150. Dr. Seuss, 924 F. Supp. at 1574.  
 151. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 152. Id. The Ninth Circuit used a First Amendment-infused balancing test to 
determine the issue of trademark infringement. Id. at 901. The Mattel court  relied on the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi, which referred to the First Amendment’s 
protection for artistic works in creating a balancing test providing creative freedom to the 
titles of artistic works while not excepting those titles altogether from trademark 
infringement liability. 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit did not, in that 
case, directly rule on any constitutional questions with respect to the title of the work. Id.
at 998-1002. The Ninth Circuit followed that lead in Mattel. Because the use of “Barbie” in 
the title of “Barbie Girl” related closely to the content of the song (which satirized the 
cultural values underlying the Barbie doll phenomenon), and because the title did not 
mislead as to the source of the song by suggesting that it was produced by the makers of 
the doll, the court found no trademark infringement. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902, 900-01 
(“Simply put, the trademark owner does not have the right to control public discourse 
whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying 
function. . . . The song does not rely on the Barbie mark to poke fun at another subject but 
targets Barbie herself. . . . [W]here an artistic work targets the original and does not 
merely borrow another’s property to get attention, First Amendment interests weigh more 
heavily in the balance.”). 
 153. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903-07.   
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lative history in construing the statute.154 It decided that the exclu-
sion for “noncommercial use” was not surplusage and was intended to 
ease First Amendment tensions in the dilution statute.155 Of particu-
lar interest is the court’s finding that the “commercial use in com-
merce” requirement of the prima facie case in the FTDA utilized a 
meaning of “commercial use” that was different than the meaning of 
commercial use in the context of the “noncommercial use” exception 
in section 43(c)(3)(B).156 It found the “commercial use in commerce” 
requirement to be satisfied because MCA had sold commercial prod-
ucts bearing the BARBIE mark, namely the album containing the 
song entitled “Barbie Girl” and the song’s single.157 In the view of the 
court, these uses constituted the required “use of a famous and dis-
tinctive mark to sell goods other than those produced or authorized 
by the mark’s owner.”158
 The Ninth Circuit determined that the “noncommercial use” ex-
clusion should be defined entirely by reference to the definition of 
commercial speech in First Amendment jurisprudence.159 The court 
made this decision based on its review of the exclusion’s legislative 
history.160 The court looked to its own decisions for this definition, 
primarily Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.161 The Hoffman court 
explained that the “ ‘core notion of commercial speech’ is that it ‘does 
no more than propose a commercial transaction.’ “162 Hoffman thus
relied on that definition and on Riley163 to find that when speech is 
not “purely commercial speech”—when it is “ ‘inextricably entwined 
with . . . expressive elements’ “—it is fully protected by the First 
Amendment.164 Accordingly, the Mattel court held that the intert-
wined, mixed speech in the case before it fell within the noncommer-
cial use exemption to the dilution statute.165
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 155. Id. at 904-06.  
 156. Id. at 903.  
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 160. Id.; see also supra Part II. 
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1180 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
 162. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 
60, 66 (1983)). Bolger, in turn, refers back to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy for the 
characterization that commercial speech “does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.” Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (quoting Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)); see also supra Part III.B. 
 163. The court also used Riley’s Ninth Circuit progeny in defining commercial speech. 
See supra text accompanying notes 123-28. 
 164. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185.  
 165. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906-07. The Ninth Circuit did not address the lingering Fox 
question of when commercial and noncommercial speech elements are “inextricably 
intertwined,” as opposed to merely intertwined at the pleasure of the speaker. 
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 The Mattel court’s broad view of noncommercial use is the only in-
terpretation consistent with the legislative history and the overall 
purpose and structure of federal trademark dilution law. An effective 
dilution statute aims to provide relief to a trademark owner when a 
noncompeting use of a mark may not cause confusion but does, at 
least marginally, diminish the previously strong connection between 
a mark and its source.166 The federal dilution law contains broad lan-
guage in the prima facie case to cover all such diminutions of source-
identifying strength167 but then provides a broad exemption from lia-
bility for all uses not constituting purely commercial speech. It does 
so in order to provide strong speech protection in the face of the gen-
eral liability provision. 
 A broad reading of the noncommercial use exemption is consistent 
with the rationale for why the First Amendment review of commer-
cial speech restrictions differs from the review of noncommercial 
speech restrictions. In the traditional justification for the distinction, 
the line between commercial and noncommercial speech exists to en-
sure that, even in the face of the First Amendment, economic trans-
actions may be regulated, including the speech directly connected to 
those transactions. The line drawing is done to insulate the economic 
regulation and speech tightly connected thereto from the most strin-
gent speech-related oversight so that the government can “insur[e] 
                                                                                                                    
 In Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796-99 (9th Cir. 2003), the 
Ninth Circuit again had the opportunity to determine whether a use of the BARBIE 
trademark and trade dress constituted infringement or dilution. The court approached the 
defendant’s use of the BARBIE mark in the titles of his photographs (which featured 
Barbie dolls in rather bizarre settings) in the same way it had approached the use of the 
BARBIE mark in the title of the song “Barbie Girl” in Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records. Id. at 
807. It concluded that “the public interest in free and artistic expression greatly outweighs 
its interest in potential consumer confusion about Mattel’s sponsorship of Forsythe’s 
works.” Id. It rejected the trade dress infringement claim on the basis that the use of the 
Barbie doll trade dress in the photographs was nominative fair use. See id. at 808-12. The 
court then cited its earlier Mattel decision for the proposition that a “dilution action only 
applies to purely commercial speech,” and in doing so referred specifically to the portion of 
the earlier opinion discussing the First Amendment conflict that would inhere in the 
dilution statute if it did not exempt protected noncommercial speech. Id. at 812 (citing 
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 904, 906). The court did not elaborate further on the proper 
interpretation of the noncommercial use exclusion or the commercial use requirement of 
the prima facie case. 
 166. Dilution statutes focus upon the strength of the source-mark connection in 
consumers’ minds, even when the statutes are not as narrow as the Schechter vision that 
would protect only “unique” source-mark connections. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 
(1995) (stating that the dilution action would protect famous marks from unauthorized 
uses that “reduce[] the public’s perception that the mark signifies something unique, 
singular, or particular”); see also discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 167. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as 
freely.”168
 In the dilution statute, however, Congress drew a line between 
commercial and noncommercial speech to heighten protection for 
nonmisleading speech connected to a commercial transaction, rather 
than to lower protection for the transaction-related expression or 
otherwise regulate the transaction itself. The “commercial” aspect of 
the transaction is captured by the broad language linking the poten-
tial for dilution liability to any “use of a mark or trade name in com-
merce.”169 The noncommercial use exemption releases noncommercial 
uses from the previously captured commercial aspect. The commer-
cial-noncommercial line in the dilution statute protects expression; 
including mixed speech within the noncommercial use exclusion ful-
fills the congressional as well as the contextual purposes of the exclu-
sion by protecting more expression. 
 All First Amendment analyses present a balance of competing in-
terests—balancing an arguably legitimate governmental interest 
against a speech interest—and the specifics of the balancing analysis 
depend on the nature of the regulation and the speech at issue.170
Here, by giving defendants a general noncommercial use exclusion, 
Congress did its own balancing on a categorical level rather than ask-
ing courts to engage in case-by-case balancing to determine whether 
dilution liability, as applied to a specific use, is a valid limit on the 
defendant’s First Amendment freedom.171 The statute reflects a con-
                                                                                                                    
 168. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 
(1976). A plurality opinion of the Court in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island explained 
the operation of most commercial-noncommercial speech distinctions: 
Our opinion [in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy] noted that the greater 
“objectivity” of commercial speech justifies affording the [government] more 
freedom to distinguish false commercial advertisements from true ones, and 
that the greater “hardiness” of commercial speech, inspired as it is by the profit 
motive, likely diminishes the chilling effect that may attend its regulation. 
 Subsequent cases explained that the [government’s] power to regulate 
commercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial 
speech that is “linked inextricably” to those transactions. . . . Nevertheless, as 
we explained in [Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 
96 (1977)], the [government] retains less regulatory authority when its 
commercial speech restrictions strike at “the substance of the information 
communicated” rather than the “commercial aspect of [it]—with offerors 
communicating offers to offerees.”  
517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). 
 169. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
 170. See supra Part III.A. 
 171. This Article argues for application of the noncommercial use exclusion as a cate-
gorical affirmative defense. I use the term “categorical” to indicate that once the defen-
dant’s use is determined to fall within “noncommercial use,” the analysis ends, and the 
court rules in favor of the defendant. By contrast, under a typical First Amendment analy-
sis, after finding noncommercial speech, the court would then begin balancing the defen-
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gressional determination that arguably diluting, noncommercial uses 
do not pose such a risk of commercial harm to trademark owners that 
regulation of those uses via dilution is warranted. Under the statute 
Congress created, the noncommercial statute of a use “trumps,” in a 
sense, any commercial harm that may be posed by that use. To the 
extent Congress was thinking in clear First Amendment terms, one 
might say that Congress determined that the expressive value of 
those uses, as a group, outweighed the risk of serious commercial 
harm posed by those uses.172
 The decision to protect expressive uses from dilution liability (but 
not necessarily infringement liability)173 is consistent with the tradi-
tional First Amendment protection given to speech which is neither 
commercially deceptive nor commercially fraudulent.174 This is not to 
                                                                                                                    
dant’s speech interest against the trademark liability rule. See supra text accompanying 
notes 91-94. 
 172. The Supreme Court also, at times, strikes categorical balances rather than relying 
only on case-by-case, ad hoc balancing by individual judges of speech and governmental 
interests. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court used standards of liability to further 
define a categorical balance between the legitimate governmental interest underlying 
defamation law and the free speech interest of the media in engaging in discussion of 
public officials and figures, in contrast to the speech interest in discussing private 
individuals. 418 U.S. 323, 342-44 (1974),  In defense of its categorization, the Court stated 
the following: 
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs of the press and the 
individual’s claim to compensation for wrongful injury might be struck on a 
case-by-case basis.  As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, “it might seem, purely 
as an abstract matter, that the most utilitarian approach would be to scrutinize 
carefully every jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain whether the 
final judgment leaves fully protected whatever First Amendment values 
transcend the legitimate state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who 
prevailed.” But this approach would lead to unpredictable results and 
uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower 
courts unmanageable. Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests 
at stake in each particular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of 
general application.  Such rules necessarily treat alike various cases involving 
differences as well as similarities. Thus it is often true that not all of the 
considerations which justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each 
particular case decided under its authority. 
Id. at 343-44 (citation omitted). 
 173. In contrast to arguably diluting uses, infringing uses risk multiple harms—to 
consumers and to proprietary interests. Accordingly, even expressive uses of marks that 
create a likelihood of confusion do not enjoy categorical immunity from infringement 
liability, although they might be protected based on the particular circumstances of a case. 
See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d 
Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). For further discussion of 
expressive uses in the likelihood of confusion context, see Pratheepan Gulasekaram, 
Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized 
Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887 (2005). For an argument that 
infringement claims and trademark law generally deserve greater First Amendment 
scrutiny than is currently the case, see Ramsey, supra note 82. 
 174. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501-04. 
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say that noncommercial uses cannot dilute commercial selling power 
by diminishing the commercial strength of the source-mark connec-
tion. The point is simply that noncommercial uses, as a whole, carry 
a lower risk of significant commercial effects—a level of risk of harm 
that pales in comparison to the likely chilling effect on noncommer-
cial uses if those uses are not excused as a clear, categorical matter. 
Congress made the choice to privilege the broad category of noncom-
mercial uses rather than to regulate the diluting effect of those uses, 
and courts should respect and enforce that decision as it is expressed 
by the statutory exclusion. 
B.   Constitutionality of Restricting Only Commercial Speech 
 Interpreting “noncommercial use” to include any use other than 
“commercial speech”—speech proposing a commercial transaction—
means that the dilution statute presents solely a regulation of com-
mercial speech. As a commercial speech regulation, it is still subject 
to direct First Amendment analysis—after all, statutes discriminat-
ing between commercial and noncommercial speech, and then re-
stricting only commercial speech, are not immune from First 
Amendment attack.175 But in this case, broadly interpreting non-
commercial use to limit dilution claims to apply only to commercial 
speech indicates that the exclusion helps to tailor the dilution statute 
to serve its specific purpose. This makes the TDRA more likely to 
                                                                                                                    
 When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from 
misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure 
of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent 
with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech 
and therefore justifies less than strict review. However, when a State entirely 
prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages 
for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is 
far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment 
generally demands. 
 Sound reasons justify reviewing the latter type of commercial speech 
regulation more carefully. Most obviously, complete speech bans, unlike 
content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, or manner of expression, are 
particularly dangerous because they all but foreclose alternative means of 
disseminating certain information. 
Id. at 501 (citation omitted). 
 175. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422-28 
(1993) (refusing to validate Cincinnati’s restriction on commercial newsracks (but not on 
newsracks for newspapers) under a commercial speech analysis in light of the fact that the 
city had not demonstrated a basis for distinguishing between types of newsracks or an 
interest in preventing a commercial harm posed by the newsracks); see also LaFrance, 
supra note 50; Rebecca Tushnet, Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commercial 
Speech Doctrine, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH 294-323 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); Tushnet, supra
note 50, at 546-61.  
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withstand a potential constitutional challenge under the Central 
Hudson test for regulations of commercial speech.176
 Trademark laws are a long-standing, traditional form of commer-
cial speech regulation; but that status alone does not indicate that 
the contours of trademark law do not need to be refined by attention 
to First Amendment values. Dilution laws, both state and federal, 
draw more First Amendment scrutiny from courts and commentators 
than standard trademark infringement laws because they do not re-
quire any showing of consumer confusion. Standard infringement 
causes of action require, at a minimum, that the trademark owner 
show a likelihood of consumer confusion.177 Courts consider actual 
confusion, but it is not required before liability will attach.178 The re-
levant confusion can be as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation,179
which means that noncompeting goods or services bearing the plain-
tiff’s mark, or one similar thereto, may still create liability for trade-
mark infringement.180 Consumers may be crystal-clear on the fact 
that the goods in fact come from different producers, but liability may 
still attach due to likely confusion about a relationship between the 
producers or some form of approval by the plaintiff of the allegedly 
infringing use of the mark.181 A broad variety of confusing uses fall 
within the scope of the action, but in any event, the court must find a 
likelihood of some form of confusion. 
 The Central Hudson scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech 
only applies to restrictions on truthful, nonmisleading commercial 
speech.182 The likelihood of confusion requirement in infringement 
laws might appear to restrain only misleading commercial speech. 
                                                                                                                    
 176. As explained in Part III.A. of this Article, Central Hudson is the measure courts 
use to judge whether a regulation’s effect on commercial speech violates the First 
Amendment. Despite substantial criticism of the Central Hudson analysis, see, e.g., Robert 
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000), it 
remains the governing paradigm for judicial review. As a result, in this Article I apply 
Central Hudson to the dilution statute, although I do not herein endorse that analysis.
 177. See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
117 (2004); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769-70 (1992); 15 U.S.C. § 
1114(1)(a)-(b) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).  
 178. See, e.g., Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 
640 (1st Cir. 1992); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872-
73 (2d Cir. 1986).    
 179. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
 180. See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, D.D.S., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127 
(N.D.N.Y. 1993) (enjoining defendant’s use of MCDENTAL for a dental clinic based on a 
likelihood of confusion with MCDONALD’S for primarily food-related goods and services). 
 181. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual 
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 909-910 (2007) (listing cases representative of the 
varying types of confusion addressed in the case law, including endorsement, affiliation, 
association, connection, authorization, permission, and the like).  
 182. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
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Accordingly, those statutes would receive no First Amendment scru-
tiny under Central Hudson:183
 The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based 
on the informational function of advertising. Consequently, there 
can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial 
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful ac-
tivity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely 
to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial speech related 
to illegal activity.  
 If the [commercial] communication is neither misleading nor re-
lated to unlawful activity, the government’s power is more circum-
scribed.184
Because the Central Hudson formulation excludes misleading com-
mercial speech from its First Amendment scrutiny, few, if any, courts 
are likely to find that enjoining a likely confusing commercial use of a 
trademark violates the First Amendment.185
This blanket exculpation of infringement laws is not, however, 
entirely without issue when viewed through a First Amendment 
lens.186 Trademark infringement liability requires only likely, rather 
than actual, confusion. Yet commercial speech jurisprudence asks 
whether the speech is false or misleading, rather than whether it 
might be, when determining whether the Central Hudson level of 
protection applies. As other scholars have discussed in greater detail, 
in other instances of government regulation of commercial speech, 
the possibility of misleading consumers does not justify all regula-
tions of professional advertising.187 Nevertheless, the connection be-
tween misleading consumers (Central Hudson) and trademark in-
fringement liability has generally sufficed to end most serious First 
Amendment discussion by a court.188
 In contrast, dilution laws provide a trademark owner with a cause 
of action even when no consumer confusion of any kind is likely. The 
federal dilution cause of action allows for an injunction when a use of 
                                                                                                                    
 183. See infra Part III.A. 
 184. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64 (citations omitted). 
 185. Cf. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (refusing to enjoin, upon 
the challenge of famed dancer Ginger Rogers, the use of the title Fred and Ginger for a 
movie about two ballroom dancers who used the stage names Fred and Ginger, but using a 
balancing test rather than a blanket exclusion or defense). 
 186. See Ramsey, supra note 82, at 415. 
 187. See Tushnet, supra note 86 at 741-744 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
professional services advertising cases and their invalidation of prohibitions on potentially 
misleading commercial speech, as contrasted with actually or inherently misleading 
commercial speech); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Prof’l Reg’n, 512 U.S. 136, 146 
(1994); accord Ramsey, supra note 82. 
 188. Cf. Rogers, 875 F.2d 994, 998-99 (“Because overextension of Lanham Act 
restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First Amendment values, we must 
construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a conflict.”). 
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a mark or trade name in commerce is likely to dilute a famous mark, 
“regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion.”189
A typical state dilution statute provides for injunctive relief when, 
despite the lack of competition between parties, the defendant’s activ-
ities are likely to injure the business reputation of the plaintiff or are 
likely to dilute the distinctive quality of plaintiff’s trademark.190 Both 
federal and state dilution laws apply to situations where no confusion 
exists. Without the requirement of confusion, or even the mere like-
lihood of confusion, diluting uses do not fall within Central Hudson’s 
sidelining of misleading commercial speech. As a result, the First 
Amendment becomes more likely to succeed as a valid defense to a di-
lution claim, as compared to an infringement claim.191
 After threshold inquiries regarding the nature of the speech being 
regulated, which inquiries are generally satisfied in the case of dilu-
tion as set forth above, Central Hudson first requires a court to find a 
substantial governmental interest to justify the regulation.192 Stan-
dard explanations of dilution as well as the federal legislative history 
indicate that the interest supporting the federal dilution law is to 
provide famous trademarks with strong protection for their source-
mark distinctiveness.193 Mary LaFrance argues that the governmen-
                                                                                                                    
 189. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). Federal dilution liability comes in two forms, 
blurring and tarnishment. For the applicable statutory language, see text accompanying 
note 1. When the user of the diluting mark “willfully intended to trade on the recognition 
of the famous mark” or “willfully intended to harm the reputation of the famous mark,” 
monetary remedies are also available. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5). 
 190. See WELKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 14-21; DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK
DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 2008 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
5-9 (2008). 
 191. In 1982, Robert Denicola published a perceptive article assessing speech interests 
intersecting with trademark actions and concluding that the dilution cause of action  
posed a significantly greater risk of restricting or chilling protected speech than did  
more traditional trademark infringement claims. Denicola, supra note 84, at 166-90 
(arguing that both dilution and misappropriation, as rationales for trademark protection, 
posed a significant threat to speech rights because they may be used to enjoin uses  
where a trademark is used as a communicative vehicle rather than only trademark or 
decorative uses).  
 192. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980) (“At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern 
lawful activity and not be misleading.”). 
 193. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 at 3 (1995) (stating that the dilution action would 
protect famous marks from unauthorized uses that “reduce[] the public’s perception that 
the mark signifies something unique, singular, or particular”). That this justification 
relates almost exclusively to the blurring form of dilution liability, see 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c)(2)(B)(2006), rather than the tarnishment form, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C), bears 
comment. Tarnishment, given its close relationship to defamation and disparagement, and 
the obvious potential for viewpoint discrimination, may require a different First 
Amendment analysis altogether. See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 50, at 711 (noting that 
“dilution laws address two entirely different, and arguably unrelated, types of alleged 
harms, which are typically shoehorned into a single statute”). My analysis focuses on 
blurring and leaves the special issues of tarnishment to the side. 
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tal interest in providing a marginal increase in protection of goodwill 
is not substantial because “any harm to the value of the trademarks 
affected by dilutive speech interferes only with the ability of the 
trademark owners to psychologically manipulate consumers. Preserv-
ing the ability of trademark owners to influence consumers in this 
way does not amount to a substantial governmental interest.”194
While I may sympathize with her about the low value of the govern-
ment’s interest on a theoretical level, it is almost unheard of for a 
court to invalidate a commercial speech regulation on the basis of the 
legitimacy of the governmental interest.195 Given the deferential 
standard of review applied to this element of Central Hudson, the 
government’s interest in providing an additional measure of protec-
tion to the goodwill of famous marks will satisfy this requirement.196
 Central Hudson next inquires “whether the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted,”197 meaning that the 
regulation must do more than “provide[] only ineffective or remote 
support for the government’s purpose.”198 Professor Rebecca Tushnet 
argues that most uses of a trademark that alter the power and mean-
ing of that mark are not actionable under the dilution statute when 
noncommercial uses are excluded.199 I differ with her on this point 
with respect to its connection to the question raised by Central Hud-
son. And perhaps we also differ on the nature of the governmental in-
terest being accomplished.  
                                                                                                                    
 194. LaFrance, supra note 50, at 719. 
 195. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 50, at 555 n.225. I do not argue that adding dilution 
liability to the federal statute was the best policy choice that Congress could have made, or 
that dilution liability is vital to the well-being of trademark owners. I only argue that this 
is an interest likely to be accepted as sufficient to justify the statute under a Central 
Hudson analysis.  
 196. For example, during its First Amendment review of the statute protecting the 
word “Olympic” as a kind of über-trademark, the Court quickly moved past the 
substantiality of the government’s interest, which was, in part, “to ensure that the USOC 
[United States Olympic Committee] receives the benefit of its own efforts so that the 
USOC will have an incentive to continue to produce a ‘quality product,’ that, in turn, 
benefits the public.” San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 
522, 537 (1987). This governmental interest is indistinguishable from the basic interest 
underlying all of trademark law, including dilution law. So despite the fact that the 
“Olympic” statute had additional governmental interests asserted in support, such as the 
varied “Olympic” values of athletic competition and international goodwill, I find it difficult 
to imagine that the “substantial governmental interest” element of Central Hudson will, as 
a practical matter, provide a barrier to the validity of federal dilution law.  
 197. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 198. Id. at 564. 
 199. This observation leads to Tushnet’s argument that the federal dilution statute 
fails the third element of the Central Hudson analysis of a restriction on commercial 
speech because the statute does not significantly advance the governmental purpose 
underlying dilution, namely, the protection of a trademark owner’s investment in the 
goodwill of the mark. See Tushnet, supra note 175, at 318-22. 
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 I see the governmental interest as a rather narrow interest in add-
ing marginally to the protection of goodwill possessed by famous 
marks.200 I agree that dilution liability does not reach all uses of 
trademarks that would modify the mental associations that a trade-
mark owner has worked to create.201 But dilution statutes do not ac-
tually attempt to reach all of these modifications—the federal statute 
in particular tries to regulate the mark-source identification connec-
tion, which is the trademark’s distinctiveness as a mark.202 Trademark 
goodwill contains that commercial connection, but it does not encom-
pass all of the personal, emotive connections that may also arise in a 
consumer’s mind in relation to a mark. To say it another way—not all 
alterations of power and meaning of a famous mark dilute the trade-
mark distinctiveness of that mark. “Distinctiveness” is not a synonym 
for all of a mark’s associations, even all those associations purposely 
cultivated by a trademark owner. Distinctiveness is restricted in 
trademark law to the source-identifying meaning. Cultural power and 
commercial identification power are not synonymous.  
 If we accept an asserted governmental interest of providing an 
additional degree of protection to famous marks’ goodwill (i.e., their 
source-identifying power) and the statutory construction of noncom-
mercial use that excludes all but core commercial speech from liabili-
ty, we can make a judgment about the relationship of the regulation 
to the interest. With these premises, the noncommercial use exclu-
sion actually means the dilution statute more accurately targets the 
source-identifying connection possessed by a mark, as opposed to the 
other connections associated with a mark. The exclusion bolsters the 
argument that the TDRA directly advances, rather than only remote-
ly supports, the governmental interest in preventing the limited 
commercial harm of reduced distinctiveness in the marketplace. 
 Central Hudson asks finally “whether [the regulation] is not more 
extensive than is necessary to serve [the government’s] interest,”203 an 
inquiry that would not be satisfied “if the governmental interest could 
be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial 
speech.”204 The reasonableness of the tailoring in this instance depends 
on whether Congress had reason to conclude that a use of a famous (or 
similar) mark in commercial speech is more likely than a use in non-
                                                                                                                    
 200. See notes 193-96, supra, and accompanying text. 
 201. Tushnet, supra note 50, at 546-61. 
 202. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2006) (defining “dilution by blurring” as an “association 
. . . that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark”). I readily concede that this aspect 
of my argument cannot rely on the statutory or even theoretical basis for tarnishment 
liability, which speaks to the harming of the “reputation of the famous mark.” But the 
speech-impairing effects, and thus the constitutional vulnerability of liability based solely 
on reputational harm, go far beyond the scope of this Article. See also supra notes 193-95.
 203. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 204. Id. at 564. 
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commercial speech to affect the source-good connection of a famous 
mark and its commercial power in the marketplace. As discussed 
above in connection with the “directly advance” prong of Central Hud-
son, if the governmental purpose is as narrow as I argue it is, then the 
presence of the exclusion for noncommercial uses, particularly when 
mixed uses are included in the excused category of uses, strengthens 
the argument that the statute has been appropriately tailored. When 
noncommercial uses are excluded, and when the exclusion is as broad-
ly viewed as I argue it should be, then dilution reaches only those 
commercial speech uses that are likely to have the clearest commercial 
effect on the mark-source connection sought to be protected by dilu-
tion. As such, a broadly interpreted noncommercial speech exclusion 
bolsters arguments in favor of dilution’s constitutionality. 
C.   Noncommercial Use as an Affirmative Defense 
1.   A Predictable and Efficient Procedural Mechanism 
 The noncommercial use exclusion is designed to be used as an af-
firmative defense. The function of a statutory affirmative defense is 
to provide for an escape from liability for a defendant even if the 
plaintiff can prove some risk of harm or even certain harm. This 
function was confirmed by the Supreme Court in KP Permanent 
Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. in the context of the Lan-
ham Act section 33(b)(4) fair use defense to trademark infringement 
liability.205 In the same way, when a statute includes specific exclu-
sions to the general liability provision, the very function of those ex-
clusions is to narrow the liability reach of an otherwise broad provi-
sion.206 Just as a use of a mark that poses some likelihood of confu-
sion may still be fair for purposes of the section 33(b) fair use de-
fense, a use of a mark that poses a likelihood of dilution may be non-
commercial and thus exempt from dilution liability. 
                                                                                                                    
 205. 543 U.S. 111, 118-24 (2004). Although the Court made it clear in its decision that 
some possibility of confusion would not be sufficient to preclude the application of the fair 
use defense, it left room for lower courts to interpret the section 33(b)(4) requirement that 
a mark be used “fairly and in good faith” in a way that takes into account the degree of 
likelihood of confusion that may be engendered by a use. Id. at 123. The Ninth Circuit has 
taken that leeway as an open door to continue utilizing likelihood of confusion as a major, 
if not the major, consideration in the fair use defense. See KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. 
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the degree of 
customer confusion remains a factor in evaluating fair use”); see also William McGeveran, 
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV., 49, 84-87 (2008) (criticizing the Ninth 
Circuit’s position on fair use and likelihood of confusion). 
 206. Section 33(b) does, to be entirely fair, specifically characterize fair use as one of 
the “defenses or defects” to which an  infringement case involving an incontestable mark is 
subject, see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b), while section 43(c) uses the term “exclusions.” 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c). In the context of the dilution statute as a whole, however, the words are 
interchangeable; it is a distinction without a difference. 
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 At least two scholars view noncommercial use as a restatement or 
confirmation of the extent of the prima facie case, rather than as a 
defense excusing certain uses from dilution liability even if the uses 
otherwise fall within the statutory language.207 Some courts have not 
applied the defense in a procedurally consistent manner, taking the 
exclusion only as, it might seem, an affirmative sign that First 
Amendment balancing needs to be performed.208 Neither of these ap-
                                                                                                                    
 207. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 65, at 554. Professors Dogan and Lemley 
disagree with a characterization of noncommercial use as an affirmative defense, although 
they do so in a context other than a discussion of the burden of proof. Dogan and Lemley 
make their observations about the use of “exclusion” versus “defense” in order to bolster 
their argument on “trademark use.” See id. at 554 n.64 (“It is also worth noting that [15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)] is styled as ‘exclusions’ from the scope of the act, not as defenses to an 
otherwise viable cause of action, further undermining the idea that the presence of a 
‘designation of source’ or ‘noncommercial use’ limitation in that section implies that the 
general bill reaches further than that.”). There is difficulty, however, in placing weight on 
the use of the word “exclusions” for any substantive determination of the issue. For 
example, the § 107 fair use provision in copyright law is introduced by language stating 
that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 (2006). And yet the Supreme Court hesitated not at all in stating in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., that “fair use is an affirmative defense,” despite that statutory 
language. 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). Language in the fair use provision stating that a use  
is “not an infringement” aligns beautifully with language in the dilution statute  
providing that “the following [uses] shall not be actionable.”  See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).  
 I acknowledge that in the case of copyright fair use, Congress was codifying the 
judicial doctrine of fair use, which had long been treated procedurally as a defense—
namely, it was potentially applicable regardless of the plaintiff’s ability to prove a prima 
facie case of infringement, and the defendant bore the burden of proof. As a result, when 
Congress did not expressly reallocate the burden of proof away from the defendant or 
otherwise indicate a departure from the historical treatment of fair use, the Court easily 
characterized fair use as an affirmative defense. In contrast, dilution liability as a basis for 
a trademark claim does not reflect codification of judicial doctrine, nor does a 
noncommercial use defense from any form of trademark liability. As a result, courts do not 
have a historical context from which to operate in determining the appropriate procedural 
treatment for a defendant’s assertion of excusable “noncommercial use.” Still, based on the 
overall statutory structure and the logical allocation of the burden of proof, noncommercial 
use is an affirmative defense and should be treated as such. 
 208. The court in World Championship Wrestling v. Titan Sports, Inc. faced a motion to 
dismiss based on the noncommercial use exclusion. 46 F. Supp. 2d 118, 122-23 (D. Conn. 
1999). Referring to the legislative history of the exclusion as well as Bolger and Dr. Seuss,
the court interpreted the noncommercial use exclusion as removing uses not constituting 
“commercial speech” from the scope of dilution liability, even if the use increased sales. Id.
And yet the court implied that in cases where a defendant makes an expressive use, a 
balancing analysis of the sort done in Rogers v. Grimaldi is most appropriate, rather than 
placing that use squarely within the noncommercial use exclusion. Id. at 123. On the other 
hand, the court also briefly addressed the issue of mixed speech, speech “[b]etween 
advertisement and art,” so perhaps it meant to apply the balancing analysis only to the 
analysis of mixed speech rather than purely expressive uses. Id. But even that 
interpretation contradicts, in my view, the proper statutory construction. In any event, 
because the court found no prior cases to present clear guidance on how to characterize 
professional wrestling within speech jurisprudence, it declined to decide the matter on a 
motion to dismiss:  
The world of professional wrestling seems to be a hybrid of expressive 
performance and advertisement, with wrestlers trading insults, performing 
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proaches fully captures the value of the exclusion. Treating the ex-
clusion as an affirmative defense provides predictability and efficien-
cy to cases involving a noncommercial use.  
 If noncommercial use is treated as an element of the prima facie 
case, the plaintiff will bear the burden of proving a host of issues un-
likely to be relevant in garden-variety dilution cases. A range of fac-
tual and legal issues are raised by this exclusion as well as the other 
statutory exclusions.209 If a defendant does not raise these issues in 
its defense, the plaintiff should not be obligated to address them. And 
treating the exclusions as affirmative defenses comports better with 
the overall thrust of the dilution statute—to strengthen protection for 
famous trademarks—because it places the burden of proof on the de-
fendant who wishes to use the famous mark without liability. Affir-
mative defense status does mean that the noncommercial use exclu-
sion would apply even if a claim for dilution could otherwise be made 
out—even if the defendant’s use did diminish the distinctiveness of 
the plaintiff’s famous mark. No balance between the defendant’s in-
terest and the plaintiff’s interest would take place.210 I find this to be 
an entirely appropriate result. 
 Affirmative defense status is a must.211 First, the burden of plead-
ing and proving that a use is noncommercial, and that the use should 
therefore be excluded from liability under section 43(c), appropriately 
lies with the defendant.212 Importing proof of commercial use as an 
additional element of a plaintiff’s case in all dilution disputes is im-
practical and does not comport with the generally trademark-
protective nature of the statute. In light of the appropriate allocation 
of burdens of pleading and of proof, the exclusions from dilution lia-
                                                                                                                    
attention-getting stunts and challenging each other to fights in the hopes of 
attracting viewers. The balancing test called for in the case law involves factual 
and legal issues which cannot be disposed of at this stage in the case. 
Id.
 209. See 15 U.S.C..§ 1125(c)(3); see also supra text accompanying note 72. 
 210. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 211. The end result should be the same, of course, meaning there is no liability on the 
part of the defendant for the disputed activity, no injunction or damages; but the procedure 
is different (and procedure, in turn, can affect outcomes in some cases, particularly when 
the evidence is found to be in equipoise). The burden of proof changes depending on  
the operation of the provision, and the common perception of the equities might change  
as well.  
 212. But see Ramsey, supra note 82, at 421 (arguing, in the context of a defendant’s 
First Amendment challenge to a trademark infringement action, that the burden of proof 
on the commercial nature of speech should remain with the trademark holder and that the 
First Amendment is not, in those contexts, an “affirmative defense”). MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS, a commonly consulted treatise, does not specifically address the burden of 
proof in the context of dilution in detail, but it does characterize the noncommercial use 
exclusion as a “statutory defense.” J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION 24:123-128 (4th ed. 2009). 
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bility must be treated as affirmative defenses rather than in a proce-
durally amorphous manner.213
2.   The Breadth of “Use in Commerce” 
 When does the noncommercial use exclusion find practical vitality 
as an affirmative defense? In other words, when is a use in commerce 
a noncommercial use? The primary liability provision limits actiona-
ble dilution to “use of a mark or trade name in commerce,” and a 
question has been raised as to whether noncommercial speech can be 
caught in the liability net in the first instance.214 I argue that it is en-
tirely possible, and even probable, that noncommercial speech can 
survive the limitation to “use of a mark or trade name in commerce.” 
In examining whether “use of a mark or trade name in commerce” 
and “noncommercial use of a mark” are mutually exclusive concepts, 
the “trademark use” debate enters into the discussion.215
 The current federal dilution statute requires a “use of a mark or 
trade name in commerce” by a defendant before dilution liability may 
attach.216 Without taking sides in the recent vigorous “trademark 
use” debate,217 for purposes of this Article it suffices to note that in-
terpretations of “use in commerce” of a mark within that debate vary, 
                                                                                                                    
 213. Affirmative defense status also means that even at the preliminary injunction 
stage, the defendant will bear the burden of proof on the noncommercial use issue. See
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 419 (2006) 
(stating clearly that “the burdens . . . at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens 
at trial”); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (same).  
 214. See id. at 554 n.64 (calling the noncommercial use exclusion surplus language, 
“mere belt and suspenders” supporting their interpretation of a narrow prima facie case). 
“It is also worth noting that [15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)] is styled as ‘exclusions’ from the scope 
of the act, not as defenses to an otherwise viable cause of action, further undermining the 
idea that the presence of a ‘designation of source’ or ‘noncommercial use’ limitation in that 
section implies that the general bill reaches further than that.” Id.
 215. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 65, at 549-54 (arguing that the “use of a mark” 
language in the liability provision greatly narrows the scope of the dilution statute because 
they believe it requires, essentially, “use as a mark,” or “trademark use”). 
 216. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).  
217. See, e.g., Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion Over Use, supra note 45 (discussing the 
debate over trademark use and rejecting trademark use theory); Dinwoodie & Janis, 
Lessons, supra note 45; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law 
Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1674 (2007) (suggesting a framework for 
the trademark use requirement which “serves as a limited tool for identifying classes of 
behavior that cannot constitute infringement”); McKenna, supra note 45, at 773 
(attempting to “mediate[] a scholarly debate regarding the existence and desirability of a 
‘trademark use’ doctrine”); see also Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the 
Demise of “Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006) (discussing the history and 
purpose of the trademark use requirement and proposing a modern definition); Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Dilution’s (Still) Uncertain Future, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 98, 100-01 (2006) available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/ 
fi/105/dinwoodie.pdf; Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law,
54 EMORY L.J. 507, 511 (2005) (arguing that “courts should consider the [internet] search 
process stage where searchers see a trademark being used”). 
380 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:337 
but they all continue to potentially include noncommercial uses, at 
least insofar as “noncommercial use” is properly interpreted as set 
forth in this Article. For example, one interpretation of “trademark 
use,” or use in commerce of a mark, proposed in the scholarship 
comes from Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, two major participants 
in the use debate.218 They explain “trademark use” for purposes of a 
defendant’s infringement liability as primarily “branding” use, ex-
panding on that concept in these terms: a defendant’s use of a mark 
“in the process of selling, marketing, or advertising [its] own prod-
ucts,”219 and “using the mark to promote its own products or services 
[and also] using it ‘as a mark’ – i.e. to indicate the source or sponsor-
ship of those products or services.”220 Other meanings of “use in com-
merce” exist in the cases and literature.221 Certain of those meanings 
may (or may not) supply content to infringement and dilution claims, 
and I do not here endorse any of the various proposed interpretations 
of the concept of “trademark use.” But I do argue that any of those in-
terpretations could easily include uses of marks in noncommercial 
speech.222
                                                                                                                    
 218. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 217, at 1673-88. 
 219. Id. at 1677. 
 220. Id. at 1682. 
 221. See sources cited supra note 217. 
 222. The Lanham Act contains, at section 45, a definition of the “use in commerce” of a 
mark that is required for the creation of federally registrable trademark rights. First, 
“commerce” is defined as “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress,” and 
then “use in commerce” is defined as 
the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made 
merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall 
be deemed to be in use in commerce— 
(1) on goods when— 
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays 
associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of 
the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated 
with the goods or their sale, and 
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and 
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services 
and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in 
more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the 
person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with  
the services.  
15 U.S.C. § 1127. It seems fairly obvious to me that Lanham Act “use in commerce” can 
cover noncommercial speech. Words on a t-shirt or bumper sticker certainly would “use 
[the words] in commerce” on goods (the t-shirts or bumper stickers) under the definition, 
since those words would be “placed in any manner” on the goods, and those goods (at least 
in almost all conceivable cases) would be “transported in commerce” within the broad, ful-
lest-extent-of-the-Commerce-Clause definition of “commerce” contained in the Lanham Act. 
 Dogan and Lemley did not advocate limiting infringing trademark use to the “use in 
commerce” required for creation of rights and conceded that asymmetry will exist between 
the more restrictive “trademark use” sufficient to create trademark rights and a somewhat 
broader understanding of “trademark use” sufficient to create potential infringement liabil-
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 Analyzing, for example, the “branding” interpretation—or a de-
fendant’s use of a mark “in the process of selling, marketing, or ad-
vertising [its] own products”—demonstrates that more than commer-
cial speech can be ensnared within the basic liability provision. Con-
sider a t-shirt or a bumper sticker bearing specific words. The t-shirt 
or bumper sticker is sold, and in the process of selling it, the seller 
even emphasizes the words displayed on the product. Such an exam-
ple would be indistinguishable, I argue, from the “branding” concep-
tion of trademark use,223 but plenty of t-shirts and bumper stickers on 
which words are placed certainly do not constitute commercial 
speech. Shirts and bumper stickers distributed by political cam-
paigns immediately come to mind,224 as do those items bearing reli-
gious slogans or even humorous (or not) commentary or platitudes. 
The same is true of book and magazine covers,225 and numerous other 
                                                                                                                    
ity. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 217, at 1675-76. Still, according to them, “[a] reasonable 
reading of the [section 45] ‘use in commerce’ definition in the infringement context would 
limit infringement to the general sorts of uses listed in the definition—i.e., uses that em-
ploy the trademark as a brand.” Id. at 1676. 
 223. The use would be indistinguishable from a “branding” use at least up to the point 
that a court made a fact-specific inquiry into the effect of the use on consumers—whether 
consumers regarded the use as an indication of source. See infra note 230 and 
accompanying text. 
 224. One example comes from the 2007 gubernatorial election in Louisiana. The Bobby 
Jindal campaign distributed, for a time, bumper stickers proclaiming “Tigers for Jindal” in 
a purple-and-gold color scheme and “Saints for Jindal” in a black-and-gold color scheme 
(among others). The Louisiana State University mascot is the tiger, and the university’s 
colors are purple and gold, while the New Orleans Saints professional football team uses a 
black-and-gold color combination. Recently, before that election, Louisiana State 
University had not been reticent about enforcing its claimed trademark rights in the school 
colors. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Smack Apparel Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 653, 656-61 (E.D. La. 
2006) (accepting the plaintiff Universities’ definition of their trademarks as “color schemes 
in the context of merchandise that makes reference to the [p]laintiff Universities or their 
accomplishments and is directed to their fans and other interested consumers,” and finding 
that plaintiffs had established secondary meaning for their claimed marks as well as a 
likelihood of confusion arising from defendant’s t-shirts), aff’d, 550 F.3d 465, 475-85 (5th 
Cir. 2008). Local publications reported that the campaign agreed not to print any 
additional stickers after the University and the team complained. According to one article, 
a University spokesman stated that officials were more concerned about a perception that 
a public university had taken sides in the race than they were about trademark 
infringement. See Jan Moller, Jindal Backpedaling on Bumper Stickers: LSU, Tulane, 
Saints Warn: Hands Off, TIMES-PICAYUNE, August 9, 2007, at 2 (available at 
http://www.nola.com/timespic/stories/index.ssf?/base/news-5/1186642607113410.xml&coll=1). 
Nevertheless, one might have understood if the state university had declined to take any 
enforcement measures against the campaign of the leading gubernatorial candidate, who 
might soon (and now does) lead the state, including wielding significant influence within 
its university systems. (For the record, while I am employed by the Louisiana State 
University system, I have no knowledge regarding any communication between the 
University and the campaign.)  
 225. Fox News sued Al Franken and the publisher of his book, LIES AND THE LYING
LIARS WHO TELL THEM: A FAIR AND BALANCED LOOK AT THE RIGHT, for trademark 
infringement and trademark dilution (including a New York state law dilution claim) of its 
FAIR AND BALANCED mark, although Fox voluntarily dismissed the action after being 
denied a preliminary injunction. See Fox News Network, LLC v. Penguin Group (USA), 
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communicative goods on which words are placed in a dominant or 
other eye-catching manner.226 It bears emphasis that a wide variety 
of goods raise this issue, not just traditional communicative goods. In 
addition to the t-shirts and bumper stickers discussed above, consid-
er the significant communicative function of coffee mugs, hats, ar-
ticles of clothing, and other consumer goods in today’s culture. 
 The above discussion assumes that little practical meaning can be 
derived from the different uses of the terms “a mark” and “the fam-
ous mark” in dilution’s prima facie case, which requires “use of a
mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution . . . of 
the famous mark.” 227 But as I propose more generally above with re-
spect to the overall “trademark use” debate in the dilution context, I 
do not think that any description of a “mark” that we now have and 
use explains the concept without referring back to the consumer ef-
fect of the use, namely whether the word, design, or other device is 
used in such a way as to designate source in the mind of a significant 
proportion of consumers. As other scholars have set forth in greater 
detail, trademark use is not an efficient gatekeeper in many (if any) 
cases because it relies on consumer conceptions about what devices 
used in connection with goods and services indicate the source, which 
leads back into likelihood of confusion. 228 In dilution, where likelih-
ood of confusion is not an issue, source-designation status, or trade-
mark use, becomes exceedingly difficult to establish in borderline 
cases. Certain uses have become widely accepted as source-
identifying uses, such as the placement of words or designs on hang 
tags attached to goods.229 But other uses of words or designs, such as 
the t-shirts, coffee mugs, and bumper stickers mentioned above, may 
be ornamental at times, may be source-identifying at times, and may 
be communicative at times. Without examining the particular use for 
its consumer effect, one cannot know. Trademark use, even if it were 
accepted as a requirement for the prima facie case, thus seems un-
                                                                                                                    
Inc., 03-CV-6162, 2003 WL 23281520 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Susan Saulny, In Courtroom, 
Laughter at Fox and a Victory for Al Franken, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2003 at B1. Judge 
Denny Chin did not rely on the noncommercial use exclusion contained within the federal 
dilution statute in denying the preliminary injunction (note that the New York statute 
does not contain such a statutory exclusion or defense), but he did reference the First 
Amendment. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Fox News 
Network, No. 03-CV-6162, 2003 WL 23281520.   
 226. For example, the music CDs in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 
903 (9th Cir. 2002), discussed further in Part IV.A. of this Article, might easily fall within 
this type of “trademark use,” since they bore the words “Barbie Girl” in a prominent 
manner on the cover. 
 227. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 65, at 549-54 (emphasis added). 
 228. See Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion over Use, supra note 45, at 1641-42; Dinwoodie 
& Janis, Lessons, supra note 45, at 1713-14; McKenna, supra note 45, at 797-98. 
 229. See, e.g., TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 904.03 (5th ed., 2007) 
(stating that labels, tags, and containers for goods are all appropriate specimens of use 
proving use of the mark in commerce in connection with a trademark application). 
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likely to efficiently, effectively, and reliably control the scope of dilu-
tion liability. Moreover, the noncommercial use exclusion itself refers 
to use of “a mark.” Asking a judge to use the concept of “a mark” to 
make close distinctions between uses falling in the prima facie case 
and those falling in the exclusion, when “a mark” appears in each, 
seems to me a request unlikely to meet with much success. 
 But even if trademark uses were efficiently and reliably identifia-
ble, there would still be practical vitality in the noncommercial use 
exclusion as a backstop for protecting speech. The fact is that dilution 
claims have been, and will likely continue to be based upon uses of 
trademarks in noncommercial speech.230 Mattel v. MCA231 (the “Bar-
bie Girl” case) provides further support for this contention. Compar-
ing two cases based on t-shirts demonstrates the vitality of the exclu-
sion in protecting valuable First Amendment freedoms, even when 
the freedom is being exercised via a mixture of commercial and non-
commercial motives.232 Without a noncommercial use exclusion appli-
cable to the relevant state or federal  infringement claims, one court 
examining a modified trademark used by a third party on a t-shirt 
found infringement liability, even in the face of a First Amendment 
defense and rather weak survey evidence of confusion.233 But with the 
noncommercial use exclusion in the federal dilution statute, another 
court protected a very similar use of a modified trademark on a t-
shirt by applying the exclusion as a defense.234 In each case, the de-
                                                                                                                    
 230. See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008) 
(holding that Smith’s modified Wal-Mart logo designs constituted noncommercial speech 
excluded from dilution liability “despite the fact that Smith sold the designs to the public 
on t-shirts and other novelty merchandise”); American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line 
Productions, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998) (entering preliminary injunction 
barring New Line’s use of “Dairy Queens” as the title of a movie about small town beauty 
pageants in Minnesota’s dairy country after finding that the title was used to market and 
identify the film and after rejecting a claim that the film title constituted a noncommercial 
use); see also Emerson Electric Co. v. NBC Universal Television Studios Inc., No. 4:06-cv-
01454-ERW (E.D. Mo. filed Oct. 2, 2006) (claiming dilution of Emerson’s IN SINK 
ERATOR trademark based on the incidental appearance of an IN SINK ERATOR-branded 
food waste disposer in a television show, when a character damaged her hand by inserting 
it into the disposer). 
 231. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 232. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987); Smith v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
 233. See Novak, 836 F.2d at 400-03 (finding infringement liability appropriate for 
“Mutant of Omaha” t-shirts sold for the purpose of bringing attention to the perils of 
nuclear war, when only about 10% of surveyed consumers evidenced confusion about 
Mutual of Omaha’s affiliation with the t-shirts following a leading question on the issue). 
Although the plaintiff had raised a state dilution claim, the appellate court did not reach 
the it on appeal because no additional remedy would be available beyond that already 
awarded for infringement. Id. at 398 n.2.  
 234. See Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 (applying the noncommercial use exclusion to 
find federal dilution liability inappropriate for “Walocaust” t-shirts, which were sold for the 
purpose of bringing attention to the corporate policies of the Wal-Mart retail chain of 
stores). Of interest, although perhaps not of legal significance, is that the decision ruling 
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fendant sold items bearing the modified mark but argued that the 
use of the modified mark on the shirts (or other items) was for pur-
poses of advocacy.235 This overlap between activities potentially creat-
ing trademark liability and activities constituting fully protected 
speech highlights the vitality of the noncommercial speech exclusion. 
3.   Comparing Noncommercial Use to a Constitutional Defense 
 At least one commentator has suggested that the potential availa-
bility of a direct constitutional defense in any event makes the non-
commercial use exclusion unnecessary.236 I disagree. The existence of 
the noncommercial use exclusion shows that Congress balanced the 
interests and determined that noncommercial speech interests are of 
higher value than the low risk they pose to the “property”-type right 
created by the dilution statute. This Congressional balancing is supe-
rior to, and operates differently from, the case-by-case balancing that 
would occur if a defendant were required to raise a direct First 
Amendment defense for an expressive use.237
 A statutory affirmative defense for noncommercial use is much 
more predictable and efficient than constitutional review of an indi-
vidual application of dilution liability to a claimed expressive use. Ef-
ficiency arises during litigation because the ultimate issue of dilution 
does not matter—the defense applies regardless of the diluting na-
ture of the use. If the defendant can prove that the exclusion applies 
at the motion to dismiss phase, there will be no need to spend re-
sources deciding the case in chief, including the resources required to 
conduct expensive surveys and experts.  
 Also, the noncommercial use exclusion allows a court to resolve 
the speech issue without requiring it to rule on a constitutional ques-
tion, something courts prefer to do only as a last resort.238 Without an 
                                                                                                                    
for Smith on infringement (which does not have a noncommercial use exclusion) covers 
twenty-three pages as published, while the decision on dilution (applying the exclusion) 
occupies less than one page. 
 235. See Novak, 836 F.2d at 402; Smith, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1340. 
 236. Gulasekaram, supra note 173, at 898 (stating that, with respect to dilution claims 
against expressive use, “the First Amendment would control, creating a fundamental norm 
that cannot be abridged by federal or state statute or lack thereof. In this sense, the 
FTDA’s statutory exemption, while helpful and clear, is superfluous: it protects what is 
already protected.”). I agree that the First Amendment controls, but because of the 
comparative simplicity of the noncommercial use exclusion versus a constitutional defense, 
as set forth further above, I do not agree that the exclusion is “superfluous.” 
 237. See supra note 172 (discussing and quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323 (1974)). 
 238. See, e.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (“Where 
a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal 
Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed from without important 
reasons.”). Siler, while not always followed, has been cited with approval numerous times, 
including in Justice Brandeis’s oft-cited unofficial rules of decision of the Court, from his 
concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority. 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 
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affirmative defense, a First Amendment defense would typically only 
be considered after the prima facie case had been decided in the 
plaintiff’s favor.239 Predictability arises from the ability of a defen-
dant to obtain a speech-protective ruling by applying only a limited 
concept from the commercial speech doctrine without opening the ba-
lancing analysis of a constitutional question. 
 Another benefit, perhaps more important, is that even if a court 
were willing to delve into the constitutional issue,240 the availability 
of a statutory defense avoids the imagined difficulty of balancing a 
private “property” right against a speech interest in any particular 
case.241 The balancing of “property” with speech can lead to reliance 
on the “alternative avenues” theory for subordinating a speech inter-
                                                                                                                    
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (setting forth “a series of rules under which [the Court] 
has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for 
decision,” and citing Siler for the fourth rule: “The Court will not pass upon a 
constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present 
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”).
 239. But see L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(reversing summary judgment for the plaintiff, L.L. Bean, on First Amendment grounds, 
over a dissent which argued that it was “premature to pass on the constitutionality of the 
Maine trademark dilution statute without a determination whether, under Maine law, a 
pornographic parody of this kind would violate that statute”) (Campbell, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted). 
 240. Not all courts avoid direct constitutional rulings, even when the exclusion allows a 
court to do so, as demonstrated by Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 
1002 (9th Cir. 2004). The district court had prohibited Nissan Computer from placing links 
on www.nissan.com or www.nissan.net to other websites with negative commentary about 
Nissan Motor. Id. at 1006-07. The district court had based this portion of its ruling on the 
need to prevent dilution in the future. Id. at 1008-09. The Ninth Circuit stated that “[t]he 
FTDA anticipates the constitutional problem where the speech is not commercial but is 
potentially dilutive by including an exception for noncommercial use of a mark. So, the 
relevant question is whether linking to sites that contain disparaging comments about 
Nissan Motor on the nissan.com website is commercial.”Id. at 1016-17 (citations omitted). 
Yet the Nissan court, after having introduced its inquiry into the divide between a 
commercial and a noncommercial use by placing it within the dilution statute’s exclusion, 
ruled by referring to the First Amendment, rather than simply to the exclusion. “[W]e 
conclude that the permanent injunction violates the First Amendment to the extent that it 
enjoins the placing of links on nissan.com to sites with disparaging comments about 
Nissan Motor.” Id. at 1018. The court’s direct resort to the First Amendment for its ruling 
is puzzling in light of the option of simply relying on statutory language and legislative 
history. It could have rested its ruling on the fact that the district court’s injunction 
extended beyond the reach of the statute it ostensibly enforced. Still, the case provides 
additional insight into the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the noncommercial use 
exclusion in the dilution statute. And it also indicates, perhaps, that the Ninth Circuit 
would be willing to apply the same reasoning to an injunction issued under a state dilution 
law without a specific exclusion—news that is heartening indeed to those who are 
concerned about the breadth of state laws. 
 241. See, e.g., Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (N.D. Ill. 
2002) (“Trademark rights need not ‘yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under 
circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.’ “) (quoting 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 
1979)); Reddy Commc’ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630, 633-34 
(D.D.C. 1977). See also Denicola, supra note 84 (criticizing this line of thinking). 
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est. Although this theory has been largely discredited within trade-
mark scholarship and case law,242 it continues to surface.243 There is 
value in avoiding further propagation of that theory. Using the non-
commercial use exclusion as an affirmative defense effectuates the 
property-speech balance that Congress already struck in favor of 
noncommercial speech. 
 Two cases in which defendants successfully used the noncommer-
cial use exclusion help illustrate the advantage of the exclusion as 
compared to a direct constitutional defense. The American Family 
Life Assurance Co. (AFLAC) attempted to stop Timothy Hagan, an 
Ohio gubernatorial candidate, from using a quacking duck reminis-
cent of AFLAC’s own quacking duck in his advertising.244 Hagan had 
mimicked the AFLAC duck when creating his “TaftQuack” duck as 
part of his criticism of the incumbent, Robert Taft.245 In denying a 
preliminary injunction to AFLAC on its various claims, including 
trademark infringement and dilution, the court first found no likelih-
ood of success on the infringement claim because the court found lit-
tle similarity in appearance between the two ducks and no competi-
tive proximity of goods or services.246 The court’s decision on the dilu-
tion claim centered on both the noncommercial use exclusion and 
First Amendment protection.247 Following a survey of several cases, 
including Mattel v. MCA and prominent domain-name-related dilu-
tion cases,248 as well as a portion of the legislative history of the non-
commercial use exclusion, the court concluded that regardless of the 
breadth of the exclusion (with Mattel representing the broadest posi-
tion), the speech in the instant case should be protected under the 
exclusion because it was political speech, which is at the core of First 
Amendment protection.249 The court was careful to note that Hagan 
did not use the AFLAC duck as a source identifier, and that he used 
his TaftQuack duck as part of a communicative message accusing in-
cumbent Taft of “ducking” issues and being a “quack.”250 As such, the 
court found Hagan’s use of the duck to be a noncommercial use ex-
empted from liability under the statutory exclusion.251
                                                                                                                    
 242. See supra note 85. 
 243. See, e.g., Kraft Foods, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 954. 
 244. Am. Family Life Ins. [sic] Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 685 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 245. Id.
 246.  Id. at 691-92. 
 247. Id. at 695-701. 
 248. Id. The court referenced, in particular, Planned Parenthood Federation of America 
Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) and Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky,
993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998). For more on these cases, see supra note 7. 
 249. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 698. 
 250. Id. at 700. 
 251. Id. at 701. 
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 As part of its First Amendment discussion, the Hagan court re-
jected AFLAC’s argument that because there were “alternative ave-
nues” available to Hagan to express his criticisms of Taft, the trade-
mark claim should be superior to the First Amendment defense.252 In 
so doing, the court sided with decisions like L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake 
Publishers, Inc.,253 which flatly rejected the argument that trademark 
property rights need not yield to speech interests, and with commen-
tators like Denicola254 who argue that speech issues cannot be de-
cided on the basis of comparing real property rights to trademark 
rights.255 The court even cited the dissent from Mutual of Omaha call-
ing the “alternative avenues” approach “ ‘inappropriate . . . [because] 
the property involved is not real estate but a trademark—a form of 
intangible property that itself conveys or symbolizes ideas.’ “256
 The court agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s Mattel decision to read 
the noncommercial use exclusion broadly, such that the exclusion en-
compasses not only speech that is entirely noncommercial, but also 
speech mixing commercial and noncommercial elements.257 It argued 
that Congress intended to exclude from liability “any speech that 
does not solely and entirely constitute ‘commercial speech,’ within the 
meaning of the First Amendment.”258 The court noted that Congress 
did not intend to incorporate all First Amendment case law through 
the noncommercial use exclusion (such as, perhaps, a need to balance 
the specific speech interest with the trademark interest in each non-
commercial use case).259 The court applied the exclusion as an affir-
mative defense rather than as a gateway to full First Amendment re-
view of the application of the statute to Hagan’s use.260 In support of 
                                                                                                                    
 252. Id. at 697-98.  
 253. 811 F.2d 26, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 254. Denicola, supra note 84. 
 255. See Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (citing L.L. Bean, which in turn cites Denicola).  
 256. Id. at 698 (quoting Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 405 (8th 
Cir. 1987) (Heaney, J., dissenting)). 
 257. Id. at 696. 
 258. Id.
 259. Id. For an example of a case engaging in case-specific balancing of speech and 
trademark interests, see Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 
Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding in an infringement analysis that “the degree 
of risk of confusion between Spy Notes [defendant’s product] and Cliffs Notes [plaintiff’s 
product] does not outweigh the well-established public interest in parody”). For an example 
of a dilution case where the court appeared to think that a finding of noncommercial use 
would lead to the balancing of speech and trademark interests, see World Championship 
Wrestling v. Titan Sports, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D. Conn. 1999) (addressing a motion to 
dismiss based on the noncommercial use exclusion and declining to perform a balancing of 
the factual and legal issues at that procedural stage). The World Championship Wrestling 
decision is discussed further in note 208, supra. For a discussion and criticism of Cliffs 
Notes, see McGeveran, supra note 205, at 101-03. 
 260. Despite its extensive discussion and application of the noncommercial use defense 
to the federal dilution claim, the court did, in ruling on the state dilution claim, state that 
“[t]he First Amendment protects Hagan from AFLAC’s dilution claim under the Lanham 
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that construction, the court noted that if Congress simply wished to 
import First Amendment protection into the statute, it would not 
have needed to draft an express exclusion at all, since the dilution 
statute could not override the First Amendment in any event.261 The 
Hagan court also decided that the First Amendment protected Hagan 
from a state dilution claim.262 The reasoning it developed under the 
federal exclusion guided its balancing of the state dilution claim 
against the use in question.263
 Another district court decision on a state dilution claim serves as 
a cautionary note to those who would read over the exclusion and 
leave defendants to rely on a direct First Amendment defense.264 That 
court heard the dispute between Ralph Nader and Mastercard that 
arose out of one of Nader’s campaign commercials.265
 Ralph Nader’s 2000 presidential campaign created and aired a tele-
vision advertisement (also available on Nader’s website) that declared 
“finding out the truth” to be “priceless,” and also used the phrase 
“There are some things that money can’t buy.”266 Soon thereafter, Mas-
tercard sued for infringement and dilution of its federally registered 
trademarks, PRICELESS and THERE ARE SOME THINGS MONEY 
CAN’T BUY. FOR EVERYTHING ELSE THERE’S MASTERCARD.267
After the court denied Mastercard’s motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion during the campaign, Nader’s campaign filed for summary judg-
ment on all counts (which also included copyright infringement and 
state law claims for infringement and dilution).268 The court addressed 
the infringement claim by balancing the traditional likelihood of con-
fusion factors and found no genuine issue of material fact related to a 
likelihood of confusion that would constitute infringement.269
 After surveying the elements of a prima facie case for dilution, the 
court noted that the FTDA “specifically exempts noncommercial uses of 
a mark from its coverage,” and it referenced the statutory exclusion.270
                                                                                                                    
Act. And, of course, the First Amendment provides this protection from AFLAC’s dilution 
claim under state law, as well.” Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 701. 
 261. Id. at 696. 
 262. Id. at 701. The state dilution statute did not contain statutory exclusions. 
 263. See supra note 260.
 264. See Mastercard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 
2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 265. Id. at *1. 
 266. Id.
 267. Id. at *2. The full Nader ad included a sequential display of a series of items 
showing the price of each (“grilled tenderloin for fundraiser; [sic] $1,000 a plate;” 
“campaign ads filled with half-truths: $10 million;” “promises to special interest groups: 
over $100 billion”). The advertisement ends with a phrase identifying a priceless intangible 
that cannot be purchased (“finding out the truth: priceless. There are some things that 
money can’t buy”). Id. at *1. 
 268. Id.
 269. Id. at *2-4. 
 270. Id. at *6-7.  
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The court then, oddly enough, analyzed the meaning of “commercial” by 
considering the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “commercial” as 
well as the Lanham Act’s definition of “use in commerce.”271 Mastercard 
had argued that the commercial nature of the ad was demonstrated by 
the fact that contributions to Nader’s campaign increased after the ad 
ran.272 The court first rejected that argument by stating that “[e]ven as-
suming the Nader Ad caused greater contributions to be made to his 
political campaign, this would not be enough to deem Ralph Nader’s Ad 
‘commercial.’ If so, then presumably, as suggested by defendants, all po-
litical campaign speech would also be ‘commercial speech’ since all po-
litical candidates collect contributions.”273
 The court never mentioned the legislative history of the FTDA. In-
stead, it referenced all the way back to comments made in Congress in 
1989 related to the false advertising provision of section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.274 These comments reaffirmed that the false advertising 
provision would not apply to political advertising.275 The court also re-
ferred to the Hagan court’s determination that political advertising, 
even advertising linked to campaign contributions, is noncommercial 
speech exempt from dilution liability under the FTDA.276 But it did not 
expressly acknowledge the earlier decision’s use of legislative history 
and First Amendment jurisprudence in reaching that conclusion.277 Af-
ter finding the Nader ad to be exempt from the FTDA as political ra-
ther than commercial use, the court went on to find that even if the 
use were commercial, there was no evidence to indicate that Nader’s 
use of Mastercard’s marks had diluted their distinctiveness.278
 Of particular interest in light of the distinctions between federal 
dilution claims and state dilution claims is the fact that the court’s 
ruling for Nader on the New York state dilution claim relied solely on 
the finding that Mastercard had presented no evidence of likelihood 
of dilution: “There is no evidence that defendants’ limited and politi-
cal use of plaintiff’s marks could weaken those marks’ ability to serve 
                                                                                                                    
 271. Id. at *7. 
 272. Id.
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at *7-8.  
 275. Id.
 276. Id. at *8.  
 277. Id. For another political speech analysis in the dilution context, see Griffith v. 
Fenrick, 486 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2007). In Griffith, the court found that the 
defendant’s use of a shortened form, Andy Griffith, of his new legal name, Andrew Griffith, 
in running for sheriff of his town, was protected by the noncommercial use exclusion 
because it was not purely commercial speech. Id.  There was no real question of mixed 
commercial-noncommercial speech because the use of the name was to seek elected office, a 
use that was entirely noncommercial because “it did not propose any commercial 
transactions,” and the seeking of contributions to his campaign was ancillary to the 
political speech and therefore protected as such. Id at 853.   
 278. Nader, 2004 WL 434404 at *9.  
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as a unique identifier of plaintiff’s goods or services.”279 Unlike the 
Hagan decision, the Nader decision did not import any of the non-
commercial use analysis into its ruling on the state dilution claim. 
 It is understandable that the Nader court did not resort to consti-
tutional analysis of a First Amendment issue when it thought it had 
another avenue that reached the same result. But in light of the chill-
ing effect of a lack of predictability and efficiency within a legal re-
gime restricting speech, it is striking to note that Nader’s campaign 
was subject to the vagaries of a dilution determination on the merits 
rather than having a clear expressive defense to the New York sta-
tute, even after the noncommercial use exclusion had been applied to 
the federal claim. This risk of liability under state law, even for core 
political speech, shows the importance of the statutory exclusion in 
the federal statute.  
 The speech concerns raised by the federal law (and state laws 
modeled thereon) are certainly more limited than they would be 
without the statutory exclusion, at least assuming the courts apply it 
as broadly as written. But state laws without statutory defenses or 
exclusions retain the direct clash with both commercial and non-
commercial speech that Congress attempted to avoid in the federal 
law. Courts applying the federal dilution statute should apply the 
noncommercial use exclusion broadly, as argued here. Courts apply-
ing state laws without a statutory exclusion should consider the ap-
proach of the Hagan decision, where the federal noncommercial use 
exclusion can serve as a guide for analyzing a First Amendment de-
fense to state dilution liability.  
V.   CONCLUSION
 This Article began with a curious question: When is a use in com-
merce a noncommercial use? Using First Amendment jurisprudence 
on mixed speech, in connection with the legislative history and statu-
tory language of the federal dilution law, we can discern the answer. 
A use in commerce is a noncommercial use when the use of a mark 
either intertwines commercial and noncommercial speech elements 
or is not an integral part of a commercial transaction, i.e., when the 
use is not purely commercial speech. The noncommercial use excep-
tion to federal dilution liability exists to give noncommercial speak-
ers, even those with mixed motives, a simple, relatively painless de-
fense that allows the judiciary and parties to end those cases early.280
                                                                                                                    
 279. Id.
 280. See McGeveran, supra note 205 at 105-06 (explaining relative paucity of cases 
decided under the news reporting exclusion by noting that the clarity of that exclusion may 
prevent claims from being brought in the first instance, and contrasting that clarity with 
the current status of the noncommercial use exclusion). It is true that defendants who are 
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 Congress created a narrower dilution cause of action than was pro-
vided by the state laws that existed at the time it enacted the FTDA in 
1995. For example, compared to state laws, Congress narrowed the ac-
tion from applying to distinctive marks to applying only to famous 
marks. In 2006, Congress further narrowed the scope of dilution to 
eliminate protection for marks with only niche fame. With respect to 
exclusions, Congress evinced a desire to ensure the continued viability 
of, among other uses, comparative advertising utilizing famous marks. 
Congress also appears to have wanted to exempt from dilution liability 
a different and far broader group of uses—fully protected speech. This 
desire culminated in the noncommercial use exclusion.281
 Application of the noncommercial use exclusion to the federal dilu-
tion statute has been sporadic. Some courts appear to shy away from 
using it—perhaps because they are concerned that applying the ex-
clusion involves a full First Amendment balancing assessment. The 
fact is, it does not. It is simply a categorical, statutory affirmative de-
fense, albeit one that relies on First Amendment case law to define a 
crucial term. In addition, it is an exclusion that, like the fair use de-
fense to use of an incontestable mark in section 33, applies even if 
the dilution plaintiff can prove its prima facie case. Courts ought to 
rely on the exclusion more—and they may find their analyses less 
tortured as a result. It is true that courts may find a large number of 
uses exempt from liability if the exclusion is applied to its fullest ex-
tent, as it was in Mattel v. MCA Records, but (1) that is the most 
straightforward interpretation of the statutory language, and (2) that 
result appears to be exactly what Congress intended. 
 A key issue for future legislative focus is to encourage states to in-
clude a noncommercial speech exception in their laws. Even if the 
“trademark use” proponents win the day with respect to the federal 
dilution action, that interpretation would have little persuasive effect 
on state dilution statutes, particularly those not amended following 
the 2006 change in federal law. With respect to dilution, the “trade-
mark use” argument is based in significant part on the TDRA’s statu-
                                                                                                                    
successful under the noncommercial use defense will generally still bear their own 
attorneys’ fees, which are not a trivial expense. Nevertheless, adding clarity should begin 
to create strong precedents which will in turn discourage suits against noncommercial uses 
in the future. If the case law broadly applying the exclusion were to become sufficiently 
clear and robust, courts could even begin to award attorney’s fees to defendants if dilution 
claims were to be made against defendants engaged in uses falling well within the 
boundaries of the noncommercial use exclusion. 
 281. See WELKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 327-28 (arguing for a broad noncommercial use 
exclusion in 43(c), despite the expansive interpretation of “commercial” activities in other 
sections of the Lanham Act, because dilution law was intended to be less encompassing 
than other provisions, and because “the legislative history of the FTDA, going back to 
1988, demonstrates a serious congressional concern that dilution would be used to stifle 
legitimate expression. The point of Section 43(c)(4)(B) [now 43(c)(3)(C)] is to respond to 
those concerns by excluding various forms of speech from liability.”). 
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tory language and legislative history. If the federal law becomes sub-
ject to the more restrictive interpretation, trademark owners wishing 
to push the envelope on dilution will simply turn to state laws in-
stead.282 Adding a noncommercial use exclusion to state laws would 
allow courts to more effectively and efficiently analyze free-speech-
based defenses to state-law claims. Perhaps more to the point for 
most state legislators, the addition would make a state dilution sta-
tute less susceptible to First Amendment invalidation.  
 Courts should not shy away from applying the noncommercial use 
exclusion as broadly as First Amendment jurisprudence teaches that 
they should, thus including mixed speech. Courts should allow de-
fendants to use the exclusion as an affirmative defense, one that can 
be ruled on through a motion to dismiss or summary judgment even 
when a prima facie case for dilution has been, or could conceivably 
be, proven.  
 Dilution protection is an extreme measure, and its standard re-
medy of a permanent injunction is strong medicine. Only commercial 
speech should be subjected to the dilution statute; that is the best  
interpretation of the exclusion in the full statutory and jurispruden-
tial context. The legislative history is clear that such a meaning  
was Congress’s intent, and it makes dilution liability more predicta-
ble (and the defense more efficient) and thus less likely to chill  
expressive uses. 
                                                                                                                    
 282. See Welkowitz, supra note 17, at 704-05.  
